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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW*
This is a review of important North Dakota Supreme Court
decisions handed down by the court from January 1978 through
February 1979. The purpose of this review is to serve as a
convenient overview of important decisions and, in some cases, a
summary of the effect that the decisions will have on North Dakota
law.
Not all decisions during this period are discussed, but only
those which we believe will have the greatest impact on North
Dakota law.
The review is divided into the following subjects:
Administrative Law ................................ 574
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*The following members of.the staff of the North Dakota Law Review prepared the analysis of
cases from January 1, 1978, to August 15, 1978: Davidj. Birk, James E. Harris, Mary Kay Klein,
and Tracy Mitchell. Decisions from August 15, 1978, through February. 1979. are reviewed by
Robert Vogel, ProfessorofLaw, University of North Dakota School ofl,aw.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The supreme court handed down two noteworthy decisions
involving workmen's compensation claims. In Wolf v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, I the court affirmed a district court
judgment which reversed an award by the North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau (Bureau) of fifty percent
benefits for aggravation arising from an employment injury, and
directed that the claimant be awarded benefits on a one hundred
percent basis, along with costs and attorney fees. 2 Prior to the
employment injury, the claimant's knee suffered from a torn
meniscus and chondromalacia of the patella, a degenerative process
involving the bone cartilage. 3 This condition did not in any way
disable him or prevent him from performing his employment. 4 The
claim arose from a further tear to the meniscus sustained in the
course of employment, which required surgery and temporarily
disabled the claimant.5 The Bureau apparently concluded that the
pre-existing condition was responsible for fifty percent of the
claimant's disability and expense and therefore awarded benefits
on a fifty percent aggravation basis.
6
Despite the fact that the employment injury aggravated the
pre-existing injury, the supreme court concluded that. because the
claimant incurred no disability or expense from the pre-existing
condition, the disability and expense incurred were totally
attributable to the employment injury.7 Therefore, the court held
that under section 65-05-15 of the North Dakota Century Code, 8
which required the Bureau to pay benefits only for the proportion
of the disability and expense arising from the aggravation of a pre-
existing condition "as reasonably may be attributable to such
1. 267 N.W.2d 785 (N.I. 1978).
2. Wolfv. North Dakota Workmen's Cormp. Bureau. 267 NW.2(1 785, 790 (N.D. 1978).




7. Id. at 789.
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (1960). The court rejected the Bureau's argument that the
amended provisions of section 65-05-15 should be applied to the case. 267 N.W.2d at 787 n.1. The
amended provision was not applied because the injury occurred before the effective date of the
amendment. Id.
Section 65-05-15 as amended provides that "[ilf the degree of aggravation cannot be
determined, the percentage award shall be fifty percent of total benefits recoverable if one hundred
percent of the injury had been the result of employment. " The amended statute still contains the
provision relied upon by the supreme court that the Bureau shall pay, in aggravation situations, only
for the proportion of the disability "as reasonably may be attributable to such compensable injury."
N. D. Cent. Code 5 65-05-15 (Supp. 1977) It would appear that the degree ofaggravation would be
irrelevant under section 65-05-15 as amended in cases where the total disability and expense is
attributable to the employment injury and that, therefore, the court's conclusions in the case at bar
would not have differed had the amended statute been applied.
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compensable injury,'" the claimant was entitled to benefits on a one
hundred percent basis. 9
In Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., "0 the plaintiff alleged in a
common law tort action that his employer intentionally and
willfully injured him by requiring him to operate a dangerous wire
winder by himself, and also alleged that, because the employer also
manufactured the wire winder which injured him, the employer
was liable under a "dual capacity" theory for negligent design and
manufacture of the machine."' The supreme court held that the
definition of injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act
(Act)1 2 of the North Dakota Century Code 3 includes intentional or
willful injuries inflicted by the employer or fellow employees when
the injuries are sustained in the course of employment.1 4 The court
did point out, however, that in some circumstances involving an
actual intent to injure, public policy might require an exception to
this rule.1 5 Because the Act did not provide an exception for
intentionally or willfully inflicted injuries, nor did public policy
require an exception under the facts of the case, the court
concluded that the Act applied to the case.' 6 Therefore, the court
held that the employee's tort claim was barred because the
provisions of the Act are the employee's exclusive remedies against
his employer or fellow employees for injuries covered by the Act. I7
The court stated that even had it found that intentional or
willful injuries were excluded tinder the Act, the intentional tort
claim would be barred for the following reasons: 1) the employer's
conduct did not constitute an actual intent to injure, 18 2) the
Bureau's decision that the injury was compensable would be given
full faith and credit under section 65-05-03 of the North Dakota
Century Code,' 9 and 3) the employee's election to pursue his
9. 267 N.V.2d at 788-89. The court did point out that if a subsequent claim is filed for future
impairment of the knee, the extent of the impairment caused by the degenerative process of the
chondromalacia should be considered at that time. Id- at 789.
10. 268 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1978).
11. Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466, 468, 473-74 (N.D. 1978).
12. N.D. CENT. CoosE Ch. 65 (1960).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8) (1960). This section was amended in 1977, bt the
supreme court applied the statute in effect at the time of the injury in 1974. The amended statute,
unlike the prior provision, states that injury "Shall mean an injury by accident ...- N.D. CFNT.
Coi)F, § 65-01-02 (8) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). Presumably, intentionally inflicted inluries
would be excepted under the amended provision. However, willfully inflicted injuries are still
included in the definition.
14. 268 N.W.2d at 470-71.
15. Id. at 471.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 472.
19. Id. That statute provides that -'the bureau shall have full power and authority to hear and
determine all questions within its jurisdiction, and its decisions, except as provided in chapter 65-10,
shall be final and shall be intitled to the same faith and credit as a Judgment of a court of record," N.
D. CENT. Coos. § 65-05-03 (1960).
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workmen's compensation remedy barred his common law claim. 20
The court also held that because the injury was compensable
under the Act and the Act is an employee's exclusive remedy
against his employer or fellow employees, the plaintiff's claim
under a "dual capacity" theory was also barred. 21
In another important administrative law decision, Johnson v.
Elkin, 22 the supreme court held that the question of whether a
statute under which an administrative agency acted is
constitutional may be raised for the first time. on appeal to a district
court. 2 3 The court also held that such an appeal is allowable only if
based solely on the record before the administrative agency at the
original hearing, or a subsequent hearing ordered by the district
court, or if based upon evidence heard by stipulation.
24
Although the court's opinion in Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle,
25
contains a discussion of several issues, the holdings of most interest
in the area of administrative law regard the precluding of a sign
company, which has applied for permits and constructed signs
under a rule of an administrative agency, from challenging the
validity of that rule.
2 6
In response to the passage of the Federal Highway
Beautification Act of 1965, the North Dakota Highway
Commissioner promulgated a rule restricting the construction of
new outdoor advertising signs along interstate highways. The
plaintiff sign company applied for permits under the rule and
constructed signs under those permits. The court held that by
constructing signs under the permits, the plaintiff accepted the
benefits of the permits and was, therefore, estopped from attacking
the constitutionality of the rule promulgated by the Highway
Commissioner which made the permits mandatory. 27 The court
also held that the plaintiff was precluded from challenging the
validity of regulations promulgated by the Highway Corridor
Board created by the North Dakota Highway Beautification Act. 28
Although the court found that these regulations were not properly
adopted, the regulations were held to be binding upon the plaintiff
because he accepted the benefits of the permit system created by the
regulations.
29
20. 268 N.W.2d at 472.
21. Id. at 474.
22. 263 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1978).
23. Johnson v. Elkin. 263 N.w.2d 123. 127 (N.D. 1978).
24. Id.
25. 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978).
26. Newman Signs. Inc. %". 1-jelle. 268 N.W.2d 741. 750-53 (N.D. 1978).
27. Id. at 750-51.
28. Id. at 752. See N.D. CENT. CoE Ch. 24-17 (1978).
29. Id. at 753.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
The supreme court dealt with several issues in the area of civil
procedure in 1978. North Dakota lawyers should note that relief
may be available when their party is ordered to submit io
discovery. In Burlington Northern, Inc. v. North Dakota District Court et
al,30 Burlington Northern petitioned the court to exercise its
original jurisdiction and issue an order to show cause why a writ
should not be issued requiring the Richland County District Court
to vacate an order compelling Burlington Northern to answer and
furnish material requested in two interrdgatories. : 1 The trial court
had granted plaintiff's motion to compel Burlington Northern to
produce an accident investigation report and copies of various
statements or memorandums of statements. 32
The North Dakota Constitution-3  and the North Dakota
Century Code3 4 provide a basis for the supreme court to exercise its
original jurisdiction to issue supervisory writs. The court stated
that its power to issue original and reticdial writs is dJiscretionary
and will be used to prevent injustice.3 5 The cotirt applied the
following two step test to determine whether an adequate showing
was made to exercise its original jurisdiction: (1) Is the action to he
supervised such that it will result in a grave or serious prejudice to
the applicant? (2) Does the applicant have another adequate
remedy?36 The court concluded that the district court order was not
appealable and that Burlington Northern did not have a plain and
speedy remedy; therefore an adequate showing for the court to
exercise its original jurisdiction was made.-"7
Landers v. Goetz38 involved an appeal of two actions which were
consolidated in district court and tried without a Jury. 39 Landers'
prayer for relief in the first action sought a determination of title to
30. 264 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 197,).
1. B urlingon Northern, Inc. v. N.I). I) is. Cotrt ra, 264 N. W .2d 453. 454(N.I). 19 78).
32. Id. at 455.
33. N.D. CONST. art. 4, § 86 provii cs as totlows: 'I'h, sutircloc ,ou't. Shall. h. ve
original .ijurisdiction with authority to issue, hear, and lIcterinin S1l01 original and remiedial wIris :is
lay )e necessary to properly exercise its Jurisdi( lon."
34. N.D. CENT'. COin . 27-02-04 (1974) which states in part as fillo s: "Illn Ilhc suprtcine
c ourt's) superintending contro over inlrior ('tlrts, it may iss ll It original and Icitl'(lial Writs as
are necessary io the proper ex cise of such jurisdictlion.
35. 264 N.W.2d at 455.
36. Id.
37. Id The court further stated that the record was inadequtne I,, dtterinanc whether the
plaintiff had made the necessary showing of a substantial ncd for ihr (11111 riln s, ir that he ws as
unable to obtain the stilstantiail CIuivatent to the miaterials Iv iher lcans is rcquirv d by N.I).R.
Civ. P, 26 (b) (3). Accordingly the east was rcoiandud to IIth. rial court l give Ilaintiff a Chant t
make the necessary showing. Id.
38. 264 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1978).
39. landers v. Goctz, 264 N.W.2d 459, 460 (N.D. 1978).
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two pieces of property and monetary relief. 40 Goetz served an
answer and counterclaim in which he prayed for a dismissal of the
complaint, for $10,000 punitive damages, and for $500 per month
until the property was restored to him.4 1 Landers served a reply
seeking dismissal of the counterclaim and demanding a jury trial.
42
Goetz brought a second action for forcible detainer of property
involved in the first action. 43 The two actions were consolidated for
trial and Landers' request for a jury trial on the counterclaim was
denied becuase the district court determined the mixture of law and
equity "would cause great difficulty to a jury and the court in its
instructions to such jury." ,44
The supreme court held that the district court erred in denying
Landers a jury trial on the issues raised by Goetz's counterclaim.
4 5
The court noted that the distinction between an equitable action
and a suit for legal relief is important to determine whether a party
is entitled to a jury trial.46 Since the Goetz counterclaim set forth a
legal claim for damages, the court found that Landers was entitled
to a jury trial on those issues. 47 The court pointed out that the
decision was not contrary to CI. T. Corp. v. Hetland,4 8 an earlier
case involving a foreclosure of a lien. The Hetland court found that
the nature of a foreclosure of a lien may involve a demand for a
money judgment, but that demand did not take the action out of
equity.
49
The court outlined a procedure for handling an action with a
mixture of law and equity. The court stated, "[w]henever. . . . a
decision in the nonjury portion might affect the decision of the jury
portion, the jury portion is to be tried first, since otherwise the
party entitled to the jury trial would be deprived of part or all of his
right to a jury trial.'' 50 Thus, both cases were reversed and
remanded so that the issues raised by Goetz's counterclaim could
40. Id. at 460.
41. Id. at 461.
42. Id. N.D.R. Civ. P. 38 (b) provides that any party may demand a jury trial on any issue
triable by jury by serving a demand for a jury trial any tnime after commencement of the action and
not later than ten days after service of the last pleading directed to the issue.
43. 264 N.W.2d at 461.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 463.
46. Id. at 462. The court stated some rules to guide trial courts in their determination of the
right to a jury trial. See Ziebarth v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 1976); Kilgore v. Farmers
Union Oil Co., 74 N.D. 640, 24 N.W.2d 26 (1946); First Nat'l Bank of Dickinson v. Kling, 65 N.D.
264, 257 N.W. 631 (1934). Iehman v. Coulter. 40 N.D. 177, 168 N.W. 724 (1918).
47. 264 N.W.2d at 463.
48. 143 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1966).
49. C.I.T. Corp. v. Hetland, 143 N.W.2d 94,101 (N.D. 1966).
50. 264 N.W.2d at 463. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Eldredge v.
Gourley, 505 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1974): Westview Community Cemetery v. Lewis, 293 So. 2d 373
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
578
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be decided by a jury with any remaining issues decided by the trial
court.
5'
Bernhardt v. Dill us5" presented two questions pertaining to
small claims court jurisdiction. 53 The court considered whether the
Stark County Small Claims Court could hear a claim involving a
defendant who was a resident of Dunn County. 54 The court noted
the statute required that "[t]he proceedings in this court [small
claims court] shall be commenced in the county of the defendant's
residence." 55  The court found that the words "shall be
commenced" indicated a legislative intent to make the requirement
jurisdictional, whereas if the legislature intended the statute to be a
venue requirement it would have used the words "shall be tried. "56
Accordingly the court found that the Stark County Small Claims
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction if the defendant was not a
resident of Stark County.
57
Next, the court considered whether the Stark County Small
Claims Court had personal jurisdiction over a defendant who
refused to accept delivery by certified mail of a claim affidavit and
order for appearance. 58 The court noted that the language of the
statute 59 requires the defendant to actually receive the order for
appearance, if sent by certified mail, not less than five days peior to
the hearing. 60 Since the defendant had not actually received the
order for appearance, the court found that the Stark County Small
Claims Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 61
In Lumber Mart, Inc. v. Haas Int'l Sales and Services, 62 the court
wrestled with the question of whether North Dakota had personal
jurisdiction over Ross Brothers Transportation, Inc., (Ross) a
Montana Corporation. 63 The Burleigh County District Court
dismissed Lumber Mart's suit against Haas International Sales and
51. 264 N.W.2d at 463.
52. 265 N.W.2d 684 (N.D. 1978).
53. Bernhardt v. Dittus, 265 N.W.2d 684, 685 (N.D. 1978).
54. Id. at 685, 686.
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-01 (1974) (emphasis added.)
56. 265 N.W.2d at 686.
57. Id. at 687.
58. Id. Defendant refused to accept the certified mail because he believed the letters were bills
fiot plaintiff. There was no evidence in the record of a return receipt or other proof that defendant
had received the claim affidavit and the order for appearance. Id.
59. N.D. CENT. COE 5 27-08.1 -02 (1974) provides as follows:
Actions in small claims court shall be commenced whenever any person executes and
files with the court a claim affadavit, anc .. .mails to him [delendant] by certified
mail along with an order for appearance setting a hearing. Such hearing shall not be
less than five days and not more than thirty days after the service or receipt of the
order. The mailing. or personal service, tnav be made anywhere within the state.
60. 265 N.W.2d at 687.
61. Id. The court made this finding as additional support for the Stark County District Cour
order vacating the defaultjudgment ofl the Stark County Small Claims Court. Id.
62. 269 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1978).
63. Lumber Mart. Inc. v. Haas Int'l. Sales and Services. 269 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1978).'
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Services (Haas) and Ross for lack of personal jurisdiction over
Ross. 64 The complaint alleged that Haas and Ross negligently
repaired a diesel tractor owned by Lumber Mart. 65  Haas
overhauled the tractor in August 1976 in Mandan, North Dakota,
and on the first trip to Montana after the overhaul, a malfunction
necessitated repairs by Ross in Circle, Montana. 66 Additional
repairs by Haas in January 1977 were followed by another tractor
malfunction in Montana, which required repairs by Ross. 67 On the
return trip to Mandan, the tractor broke down near Dickinson. 68
Ross traveled to Dickinson and towed the truck to Montana for
repairs. 69 Several phone calls were exchanged during the course of
the final repairs. 70 After finishing the repairs, Ross delivered the
tractor to Lumber Mart in Mandan, North Dakota. 7' Ross was
engaged in the following contacts with North Dakota that were not
related to this action: (a) registration with the North Dakota
Highway Department Truck Regulatory Division, which required
a permit each time Ross used North Dakota highways, (b) hauling
potatoes from eastern North Dakota to Montana, and (c)
conducting business with a Mr. Bohlman in Dickinson, North
Dakota. 72
On appeal Lumber Mart contended that North Dakota had
personal jurisdiction over Ross pursuant to North Dakota long-arm
provisions. 73  The court noted that the personal jurisdiction
requirement of North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) is met if
a non-resident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with
North Dakota so the exercise of personal jurisdiction will not offend
the basic requirements of due process.7 4 The court found that
64. Id. at 84.
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id. at 85.
(i8. Id
69. Id. This repair was not alleged to be done negligently. Id.
70. Id. Approximately half of the phone calls were initiated by Ross. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brief lur Appellant at 5. The North Dakota long-arm provisions are found at N.D. R. Ci.
P. 4 (b) (2) which provides in part as fillows:
A court of this state may exercise personal Jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent as to any claim for relief arising from the person's
(A) transacting any business in this state:
(B) contracting to supply or supplying services, goods, or other things in this
state;
(C) corrioittirg a tort within or itlout this state causing injury to another person
or property within this state;
(H) enjoying any other status or capacity v ithin this state. including
cohabitation, or engaging in an\ other activity having such contact with this state that
the exercise of personal jurisiiction over him does not ilfend against traditional
notions ofjustice or fair play or the due process of law.
74. 269 N.W.2d at 86.
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personal jurisdiction over a non-resident could not be exercised
unless the non-resident's contacts in North Dakota are of such
scope, nature and sufficiency to provide general jurisdiction, or the
non-resident has minimal contacts in North Dakota directly related
to and connected with the cause of action.
75
Although the court did not deal extensively with the question
of general jurisdiction, it did cite with approval Cornelison v.
Chaney7 6 to support its finding that North Dakota lacked general
jurisdiction over Ross.7 7  In Cornelison, Chaney, a Nebraska
defendant, was an interstate trucker with a California license.78
Chaney made approximately twenty trips per year for seven
consecutive years with a cargo value of $20,000 a trip.79 In finding
that California lacked general jurisdiction over Chaney, the
California Supreme Court found that Chaney's activities were not
"substantial" or "continuous and. systematic" so as to warrant
jurisdiction without the cause of action being related to those
activities. 80 The North Dakota Supreme Court's opinion avoided
an independant analysis of whether Ross's activities were
"substantial" or "continuous and systematic" and instead found
the lack of general jurisdiction over Ross was controlled by
Cornelison. 81
The bulk of the court's decision was based on North Dakota's
long-arm provisions. 82 The court correctly found that the long-arm
provisions applied when the non-resident's contacts were directly
related and connected with the cause of action. 83 The court found
that Ross's contacts with Lumber Mart in North Dakota resulted
from the repairs in Montana and occurred after the facts that gave
75. Id. at 89.
76. 16 Cal.2d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
77. 269 N.W.2d at 89.
78. Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal.2d 143, 147, 545 P.2d 264, 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354
(1976).
79. Id. at 146, 545 P.2d at 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
80. Id. at 147-49, 545 P.2d at 266-67, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55. The generally accepted test for
general iirisdiction over a non-resident defendant provides that if the activities are "extensive or
wide ranging" or "substantial or continuous and systematic" then there is a constitutionally
sufficient relationship to allow jurisdiction for all causes of action against the defendant. See, Perkins
v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology
Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969);
Southern Machine Co. v. Mahasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968); Volkswagon
Interamerica, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Stiperior Court, 71 Cal.2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, (1969). See.eenerally F.
JAMRS, CIVIL PROCEIRE § 12.8 (1965).
81. 269 N.W.2d at 89. In reviewing the facts of Cornelison, the North Dakota Supreme Court did
say, "'iThel Nebraska. . defendant. . . had been engaged in a continuous course of conduct that
brought him into the State of California almost twice a month for a period of seven years..." Id. at
87. (emphasis added). Thus, the court seems to have ruled inconsistently by saying on one hand that
they followed Cornelison and at the same time saying the defendant in Cornelison was engaged in a
continuous course ofconduct in California.
82. See supra note 73.
83. 269 N.W.2d at 89.
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rise to the cause ot action. 84 The court refused to adopt as a basis of
long-arm jurisdiction an activity happening after the alleged
negligence and stated that such jurisdiction would be a disservice to
justice. 85
Mr. Justice Vogel, in dissent, disagreed with the proposition
that after the fact activities could not establish jurisdiction and
stated that any status or conduct which brings the defendant within
the terms of the long-arm rule as of the time of the commencement
of the action would be sufficient. 86 The dissent would have found
jurisdiction based on the long-arm rule and the fact that Ross
engaged in other activities having contact with North Dakota so
that exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice or due process.
87
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In 1978, the court had several opportunities to apply due
process / equal protection analyses with varying degrees of success.
In Johnson v. Elkin, 8 8 the court upheld a statute89 requiring licensing
of building movers, stating that such a regulation is not a violation
of due process rights. 90 Plaintiff Johnson had applied to the Public
Service Commission (PSC) for a Special Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity which authorizes the transportation of
buildings and bulky objects. 91 After a hearing, the PSC denied the
application on the grounds that public convenience and necessity
did not require a granting of the application and that Johnson was
financially unable to provide the services.
92
Johnson appealed the administrative decision pursuant to the
Administrative Agencies Practice Act, 93 claiming that the PSC
decision violated his constitutional rights.94  Although no
constitutional issues were raised on the record at the PSC hearing,
the district court found the statute unconstitutional. 95 The PSC
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court for a determination
84. Id at 90.
85. Id. at 91.
86. Id. (Vogel & Pederson.JJ. disenting).
87. Id. at 92-93.
88. 263 N.\N.2d 123 (N.D. 1978).
89. N.D. CENT. CODE 15 49-18-12 (1978).
90.Johnson v. Elkin. 263 N.W,2d 123. 128 (N.D. 1978).
91. ND.CENT. CODE § 49-18-12 (1978).
92. 263 N.%V.2d at 125.
93. N.D. CENT. Coni ch. 28-32 (1974 & Supp. 1977).




of whether a litigant can raise constitutional questions for the first
time on an appeal to a district court. Distinguishing a prior case,
'9 6
the court allowed the constitutional issue to be raised, stating that
administrative agencies have no authority to decide upon the
constitutionality of the statutes under which they operate.97
Having resolved this issue, the court adopted a substantive
due process test which allows state regulation of a business where
such regulation is "reasonably required and appropriate for the
public protection. '98 Because the building moving business could
involve damage to highways and utility lines, 99 the requisite need
for regulation to protect the public was present.
A later case, Arneson v. Olson, 100 purports to use a substantive
due process standard,10' but the application is not clear. The court
declared the 1977 Medical Malpractice Act unconstitutional.1
0 2
The Act contained a number of questionable provisions including
the requirement that all physicians must have malpractice.
insurance in order to become licensed in North Dakota, 0 3 and that
recovery in a medical malpractice case be limited to a $300,000
maximum. 10 4 The court analyzed much of the case using due
process / equal protection standards.
Traditionally, the two-tiered equal protection test analyzes a
statute with a "strict scrutiny" standard when the statute involves
a suspect classification or a fundamental right. 10 5 Where the
classification is not suspect, a "rational basis" standard is
applied. 10 6 A third standard evolved which modifies the two
extremes. This middle ground requires a "close correspondence
between statutory classification and legislative goals.) 107
Having set this test out, the court equated the substantive due
process test with the middle ground equal protection test'08 and
apparently used these terms interchangeably in analyzing the
statute. The result is uncertainty as to the distinction between
substantive due process and equal protection in North Dakota.
96. Benson v. North Dakota Workmcn's Compensation Bureau, 250 N.W.2d 249 (N.I). 1977).
The court did not allow an appeal as to the constittitonality of section 65-01-02(4)(a)(1) of th North
Dakota Century Code because the issue was not raised initially at the adltinisttatvc hearing. Id. at
251.
97. 263 N.W.2d at 126.
98. Id. at 129.
99. Id. at 130.
100. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
101. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132-33 (N.D. 1978).
102. Id. at 138. N.D. CENT. Coi). chs. 26-40.1 and 43-17.1 (1977).
103. 270 N.W.2d at 134. N.D. C NT. Coo. § 26-40.1-12 (1977).
104. 270 N.W .2d at 135. N.D. C T. ConFe § 26-40.1-11 (1977).
105. 270 N.W.2d at 132-33.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 133.
108. Id.
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The court held that procedural due process was satisfied in
Dickinson v. State Board of Equalization. 109 The city of Dickinson
challenged the decision of the State Board of Equalization (Board)
which had decreased by ten percent the taxable business and
residential real property in Stark County, where Dickinson is
located. 110 This decision was made at the annual meeting of the
Board which was held, pursuant to the North Dakota Century
Code, "on the second Tuesday in August at the office of the state
tax commissioner. '' 111
Dickinson argued that no change in the assessment of taxable
realestate within the city could be made without prior notice. 112
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, relying
principally on the decision in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board
of Equalization. 113 The court determined that where the statute
specifies the time and place of the meeting, the procedural due
process requirement of prior notice is met. 1 14 Where the meeting
deals with taxation of an individual, as opposed to a tax district or a
class of taxpayers, notice requirements are more stringent. 15
A case which is not concerned with equal protection/due
process standards is Cardiff v. Bismarck Public School Dist. 116 Parents
of elementary school children challenged the Bismarck school
district's authority to require rental fees for necessary textbooks.
The challenge was based on section 148 of the North Dakota
Constitution which provides for "a uniform system of free public
schools throughout the state. 1 1 7 The court hinged its analysis on
the meaning of "free public schools." After an extensive discussion
of North Dakota legislative history, 118 and the constitutional
provisions and case law of other states,119 the court determined the
term "free public schools" means more than "without tuition"
and must include items "essential to education.' 120 Textbooks
were determined to be necessary to education, thus North Dakota
elementary schools cannot charge rental fees for textbooks. The
109. 268 N.W.2d 589, 593 (N.D. 1978).
110. Dickinson v. State Board of Equalization, 268 N.W.2d 589, 590 (N.D. 1978).
111. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-13-03 (1972 & Supp. 1977).
112. 268 N.W.2d at 590.
113. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). The Court upheld a tax assessment valuation made without prior
individual notice as proper, stating that the people's rights "are protected in the only way that they
can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."
Id. at 445.
114. 268 N.W.2d at 593.
115. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-13-04(4) (1972).
116. 263 N.W.2d 105 (N.D. 1978).
117. N.D. CONST. art. 8, § 148.
118. Cardiffv. Bismarck Public School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107-09 (N.D. 1978).
119. Id. at 109-13.
120. Id. at 113.
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decision is expressly limited to elementary schools as the case was
not a class action and arguments and briefs related only to
elementary schools. 1
21
The status of section 16-20-17.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code is uncertain after the decision in State v. North Dakota Education
Association. 122 Members of the court attempted to declare a statute
barring publication of anonymous political advertisements
unconstitutional, 12 3 but only three justices found the statute
unconstitutional.1 4 The case concerned the publication of an
appeal to vote "no" on Initiated Measure No. 1. The
advertisement appeared, without a disclaimer, in the North Dakota
Education News. 125
In arriving at its decision, the majority relied on the first
amendment right of free speech, citing the value of anonymous
political pamphlets written prior to the Revolutionary War and
emphasizing the right to speak without fear of reprisal. 126 The
dissent viewed this justification for anonymity as unrealistic,
focusing on advertising relating to political candidates. The dissent
believed that the liklihood of "anonymous smears, related evils,
and abuses of the electoral process' '1 27 justify the disclosure
requirement. Thus, the vacillation of Justice Sand results in
uncertainty as to the status of section 16-20-17.1.
CONTRACTS
The North Dakota Supreme Court decided several contract
cases during the 1978 term, two of which involved interpreting and
applying provisions of the land contract cancellation statutes. 128
In Johnson v. Gray, 129 the plaintiffs, vendors in a contract for
deed with the defendants, attempted in their cancellation notice to
the defendants to accelerate the payments as permitted by the
contract, and condition reinstatement of the contract upon the
121. Id.
122. 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978).
123. State v. North Dakota Ed. Ass'n., 262 N.W.2d 731, 736. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16-20-
17.1 (Supp. 1977).
124. N.D. CONST. art. 4. § 89 requires that no law or legislative enactment shall "be declared
,mconstituitional umless at least four of the judges shall so decide . ..- (Vogel, Erickstad, &
PedersonJJ., concurring; Sand, ,concurring and dissenting; PaulsonJ., dissenting).
125. 262 N.W.2d at 732.
126. Id. at 734-35.
127. Id. at 741.
128. The land contract cancellation statutes are contained in N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-18
(1976).
129. 265 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1978).
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payment of the entire accelerated balance, in addition to the ma-
king of agreed upon tax and insurance payments. 
130
The court relied on authority from Minnesota
13 1 and Iowa, 132
and ruled that the legislature could not have contemplated this use
for the cancellation statute. Accordingly the plaintiff was not
permitted to proceed under the contract, which allowed accel-
eration of payments upon failure of performance, to declare the
entire balance due, and then utilize the cancellation statutes to
condition reinstatement of the contract upon the full payment.'
33
The court ruled that chapter 32-18 of the North Dakota Century
Code contemplated only requiring the defaulting party to cure
those defects in performance which, by virtue of previous non-
performance, had resulted in default. ,
34
The court also found that the cancellation notice sent by the
plaintiff complied with the statute even though it conditioned
reinstatement of the contract on acts which did not constitute
defects in performance and called for payments in excess of that
allowable under the statute. 135 The defendant unsuccessfully
argued that the notice was ineffective because it attempted to
condition reinstatement upon payment of the entire unpaid
balance, which was unlawful; failure to pay interest, which was
accruing, but not necessarily due under the terms of the contract;
payment of taxes, which were not due at the time of the notice; and
payment of insurance premiums. 136
The court reasoned that an otherwise proper notice of
cancellation pursuant to chapter 32-18 is not made ineffective by
including additional improper terms.137 Since the notice did specify
defects in the defendant's performance which had actually
occurred, and stated that the failure to cure the defects within one
year would result in cancellation, all statutory requirements were
met and the defendant's remedy for additional inaccurate
statements in the notice would be to petition the court pursuant to
section 32-18-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. 
138
130. Johnson v. Gray, 265 N.V.2d861. 863-64(ND. 1978).
131. See Needles v. Keyes. 149 Minn. 477, 480 184 N.W. 33, 34(1921).
132. See Hampton Farmers Cool). Co. v. Fehd. 257 Iowa 555. 559-61, 133 N.W.2d 872, 874-75
(1965).
133. 265 N.W.2d at 864.
134. Id. Thus, the defendants .ere required only to pay the late installnent and the delinquent
taxes in order to reinstate the contract. Id. at 864.
135. Id. at 864-65.
136. Id.
137. Id at 865.
138. Id. The text ofsection 32-18-06 ofN.D. CE-NT. CooF. provides as follows:
When it shall be made to appear bv affidavit of the vendee or purchaser, or his
assigns, agent, or attorney, to the satisfaction of a judge of the district court of the
county where the property is situated, that the vendee or purchaser, or his assigns, has
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The cancellation statute was also the subject of dispute in
Sadler v. Ballantine, 1'9 which involved the defendant's appeal of the
trial court's ruling in a quiet title action: (1) that plaintiff, as
vendor, had cancelled a 1972 land contract for deed pursuant to
chapter 32-18 of the North Dakota Century Code, (2) that a 1974
contract for deed to reconvey the land was rescinded as a matter of
law, and (3) that the defendant was required to return all payments
made under the 1974 contract. 1
40
In 1972 the parties executed a contract for deed for 3,200 acres
of Slope County farmland owned by the plaintiff. The contract
price of $326,000 was to be paid by the defendant in yearly
installments of $11,754. 14 1 The agreement also stipulated that the
defendant would pay all taxes and assessments, and that plaintiff
would sharecrop the land. 142 The second contract for deed,
executed in 1974, purported to reconvey the land to the plaintiff for
$600,000 in yearly installments of $20,000, and stipulated that the
defendant was to pay the taxes for 1973 and 1974, and that the
plaintiff would pay the taxes after that. 143 Under the 1974 contract
both contracts were to remain in full force. 1
44
In 1974 the parties entered into another agreement whereby
the plaintiff was to transfer to the defendant 14,400 bushels of
wheat. 145 The trial court determined that the intent of the parties
was that 10,000 bushels were to serve as part of the downpayment
on the 1974 contract, and the remaining 4,400 bushels constituted
plaintiff's sharecroping payment for 1974.146
In January 1975 the plaintiff refused to release the wheat to the
defendant until the taxes for 1973 and 1974 and the installment for
1974 were paid. In March 1975 notice was served of cancellation of
a legal cotnterclaim or any other valid defense against the collection of the whole or any part of the
amount claimed to be due on such contract, such judge, by an order to that effect, may enjoin
the vendor or his successor in interest from the cancellation of such contract by notice
and may direct that all further proceedings for the cancellation be had in the district
court properly having jurisdiction of the sub ject matter, and, for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions thereof, service may be made upon the vendor or his
assigns or upon his attorney or agent.
N.D. CENT. CoDr § 32-18-06 (1976) (emphasis added).
Since the defendants had tendered $47,000 within the one year statutory cure period, under the
mistaken belief that payment of the entire purchase price was necessary to reinstate the contract, the
ten(der was more than sufficient to cure the actual defects which consisted of one delinquent $2,000
installment and payment of insurance premiums. The court therefore held that the contract was
reinstated and remanded the case for a determination of the exact amount to be paid, and other
issues. 265 N.W.2d at 865-66.
139. 268 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1978).
140. Sadler v. Ballantine, 268 N.W.2d 119, 122 (N.D. 1978).




145. Id. at 121.
146. Id.
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the 1972 contract pursuant to chapter 32-18 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 
4 7
In August, 1975, the plaintiff released 9,400 bushels of wheat
to the defendant, and retained the remainder until November,
1976, when that was also transfered.14 8 The defendant, however,
paid the plaintiff $5,629.60 in November, 1975, which constituted
the defendant's installments for 1974 and 1975 under the 1972
contract, minus the 1975 installment payable by the plaintiff under
the 1974 contract. 49 When making this payment, the defendant
declared that both contracts were then up to date, which led, the
plaintiff to believe that the taxes for 1973 and 1974 had been
paid. 
50
After learning in March, 1976, that the delinquent taxes had
not in fact been paid by the defendant, the plaintiff paid the taxes,
recorded an affidavit of cancellation for the 1972 contract, and
instituted this quiet title action. 151
The supreme court reversed because the plaintiff failed to
effectively cancel the 1972 contract. 5 2 The court stated that a party
waives its right to cancel when that party, with full knowledge of
the operative facts, acts in a manner inconsistent with its intention
to cancel. 53 The court noted that the plaintiff's acceptance of the
installment payments for 1974 and 1975 did not constitute such a
waiver since plaintiff did not know of the defendant's continued
failure to pay the delinquent taxes. 54 But the court held that
plaintiff's acts in not releasing the wheat for eight months after
recording the affidavit of cancellation, in addition to the failure to
tender back the 1974 and 1975 installments after learning of the
continued tax delinquency did constitute a waiver of the right to
cancel. 155 The court reasoned that if the plaintiff intended to cancel
he would not have continued to hold the wheat as security for the
payment of taxes; neither would he have retained the installments
which had been accepted only under the mistaken belief that the tax
payments had been made. 56





151. Id. at 122.
152. Id. at 125.
153. Id. at 124.
154. Id
155. Id.
156. Id. at 125. The court remanded the case with instructions to reinstate both contracts on
condition that tie def'ndant tender to the plaimtif the anount of taxes paid by the plaintiff for 1973
atid 1974 plus penaliies and interest. 268 N.\V'.2d at 125-26.
157. 267 N.X\.2d 80: (N.D. 1978).
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County District Court judgment compelling specific performance
of an option contract, but reversed the trial court ruling on the
amount of interest du6 on what the trial court regarded as an
equitable mortgage. '58
In December 1972 the parties executed two agreements. The
first deeded approximately two quarters of Eddy County farmland
to the defendant and the second provided that the plaintiff would
have the right of first refusal should the defendant desire to sell the
property within five years. At the end of the five year period
plaintiff would have the option to purchase at the 1972 sale price. 1
59
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's alleged tender of
payment was at best a qualified acceptance since it was made
payable to both the defendant and the real estate mortgage holder,
the Federal Land Bank, and was delivered to the mortgagee,
instead of the defendant. 
160
The court stated that since the seller could not convey clear
title without release from the mortgagee, and since the defendant
was notified of the availability of the check and the plaintiff's
intention to exercise the option, all without response from the
defendant, the fact that the check had been delivered to the
mortgagee as the named co-payee did not render the tender
ineffective. 16 1 The court ruled that since the defendant had not
objected to the mode of the tender as required by section 9-12-18 of
the North Dakota Century Code, it became a proper tender as a
matter of law. 1
62
The second issue resolved in Haugland was whether the trial
court erred in viewing the effect of the two contracts as an equitable
mortgage and assessing interest against the plaintiff for the five year
period. 16 3 The court relied on Ginter v. Ginter 64 and held the trial
court's finding to be plain error since both parties intended a sale,
and the defendant asserted ownership to the extent of taking
possession, paying the taxes and mortgaging the property. 165
Therefore, the ruling that the plaintiff owed the defendant $6,343
in interest was reversed. 1
66
In Thompson v. First National Bank167 the supreme court
158. Haugland v. Hoy't, 267 N.W.2d 803, 807 (N.D. 1978).
159. Id. at 804,
160. Id. at 806.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 807. N.D. CENT. COOF § 9-12-18 rovides as follows: "The creditor must make
objections to the mode ofan offer of performance at the time it is made to him. If this is not done, any
objection which could have been obviated at that time is waived by his failure to make same."
163. 267 N.W.2d at 807.
164.63 N.W.2d 394,396 (N.D. 1954).
165. 267 N.W.2d at 807.
166. Id.
167. 269 N.W.2d 763 (N.D. 1978).
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affirmed a lower court ruling denying recovery to three plaintiffs in
an action against their father's guardian-conservator. 168 The court
held that a contract among the parties specifying that the defendant
would let to public bidding the lease of the ward's real estate was
unenforceable as contrary to public policy because it impermissibly
restricted the necessary discretion of the guardian-conservator in
administering the trust. 169
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that defendant violated
fiduciary duty by leasing the ward's land at lower than market
value and also violated the agreement with plaintiffs whereby
defendant would let the lease to public bidding in exchange for
plaintiffs' promise not to oppose the appointment of the defendant
as conservator. 1
70
At the trial, the defendant argued that because the plaintiffs
failed to object to or appeal the discharge granted the defendant or
the approval of the final account by the court, the plaintiff should
be foreclosed by principles of res judicata from raising those issues
in this action. 171 The trial court agreed and granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 1
7 2
The supreme court did not reach those questions and affirmed
the lower court's decision because even if the contract could be
proved, thus avoiding the res judicata issue, the contract was
unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 17 3 The court stated that
a trustee must act with unfettered discretion in the best interests of
all beneficiaries of the trust. 174 In this case, only three of the eight
beneficiaries were parties to the contract and apparently they were
the only ones with knowledge of the contract.' 75 Additionally, the
court was unaware of the existence of the contract and under these
circumstances, the contract was declared contrary to the public
policy of the state and therefore unenforcable. 116
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
In State v. Pfister, 77 the North Dakota Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret the entrapment statute of the new Criminal
168. Thompson v. First Nat'l. Bank, 269 N.W.2d 763 (N.D. 1978).
169. Id. at 764-65.
170. Id. at 763-64.
171. Id. at 764.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 765.
174. Id. at 764.
175. Id. at 764-65.
176. Id. at 765.
177. 264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1978).
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Code 78 and found that it mandates a different test than recognized
by the United State Supreme Court.1 7 9 The subjective test of
entrapment, in which the crucial inquiry is whether the defendant
had a predisposition to commit the crime, has been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court since its opinion in Sorrells v.
United States. 180 The North Dakota Supreme Court in Pfister,
however, concluded that the objective test of entrapment has been
legislatively adopted in North Dakota. 8 , Under this test,
entrapment occurs "when a law enforcement agent induces the
commission of a crime by means likely to cause 'normally law-
abiding persons' to commit it."182 Thus, in North Dakota, mere
predisposition does not preclude an entrapment defense. The
inquiry is now directed to the conduct of the law enforcement agent
and whether this conduct induced the crime. The court also held
that whether entrapment occurred is a question of fact to be decided
by thejury. 183
In In Interest of D.S. 184 the supreme court reversed an
adjudication finding a juvenile guilty of the delinquent act of
murder because evidence was improperly admitted against him at
the delinquency hearing. 185 The juvenile had been interrogated at a
detention center by law enforcement agents without an attorney,
parent or guardian present. 186 He confessed at that time and the
confession led the authorities to the location of other physical
evidence. The court concluded that a juvenile's statutory right to
counsel 187 is invoked by the custodial interrogation of a juvenile
upon whom the investigation has focused. 188 Because the juvenile
was not represented by counsel or by a parent, guardian or
custodian as required by statute, the court found that his right to
counsel had been violated. 18 9 The court also concluded that,
pursuant to statute,' 90 the confession obtained at the interrogation
was inadmissible against the juvenile at the hearing.191
Furthermore, the court concluded that the same provision
encompasses the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine and bars the
178. N.D, CENT, COE § 12.1-05-11 (1976).
179. State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694, 696 (N.D. 1978).
180. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
181. 264 N.W.2d at 698.
182. Id.
183. Id, at 700.
184. 263 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1978).
185. In Interest of D.S., 263 N.W .2d 114,121-22 (N.D. 1978).
186. Id. at 119.
187. N.D. CENT. Cot)E 5 27-20-26 (1974).
188. 263 N.W.2d at 119.
189. Id. at 121.
190. N.D. CENT. COnE § 27-20-27 (2)(1974).
191. 263 N.W.2d at 121.
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admission of evidence seized as a direct result of the unlawfully
obtained confession. 
192
The supreme court, in State v. Hass, 193 was confronted with the
question of whether a defendant is unconstitutionally compelled to
choose between asserting his right to testify at his probation
revocation hearing and his right to remain silent at a subsequent
trial for the same incident for which the revocation hearing is
held. 194 The defendant contended that when a probation revocation
hearing is held prior to a criminal trial for the same conduct, he is
unconstitutionally forced to either refuse to testify at the hearing,
thereby waiving that right, or choose to testify and thereby waive
his right to remain silent at the subsequent criminal trial. 195 The
court held that, although the defendant may have been faced with a
difficult strategy decision, his testimony at the revocation hearing
was not compelled merely because the unrebutted evidence
presented by the state may meet its burden of persuasion, 196 nor
was he unconstitutionally forced to choose between exercising two
constitutional rights. 197
In a subsequent appeal by the same defendant, the court in
State v. Hass, 198 elaborated on the proper procedure to be followed if
the prospect of a probation revocation hearing being held before
trial for the same conduct is presented. 199 The court stated that
"[ilf, in all probability, the resulting sentences after revocation and
conviction of a substantive crime will run concurrently or will not
be materially increased. .," then the revocation should be
delayed until after the substantive crime has been disposed of, at
which time it may no longer be necessary. 20 0 And if "unusual
circumstances'' require that both procedures be undertaken
simultaneously, the substantive charge should ordinarily be
disposed of first. 210 The court further stated that should revocation
proceedings be held before substantive criminal proceedings based
upon the same act, testimony given by the accused may not be used
directly against him at trial. 202 The court, however, did not
preclude the use of such testimony for impeachment purposes.
20 3
192. Id.
193. 264N.W.2d 464(N.D. 1978).
194. State v. Hass, 264 N.W.2d 464, 469 (N.D. 1978).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 471.
197. Id. at 472.
198. 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1978).
199. State v. Hass. 268 N.W.2d 456, 460-61 (N.D. 1978).
200. Id. at 460.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 461.
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The court also remanded for resentencing because it appeared,
from comments made by the judge at the time of sentencing, that
he may have "substantially relied on one or two impermissible
factors."'20 4 The judge made reference to the refusal of the
defendant to admit to "his implicity in the offense [sic]" and that he
did not personally make a statement to the court at the time of
sentencing. The impermissible factors which the supreme court
found that the judge may have relied on were the defendant's
refusal to plead guilty and his failure to respond in person rather
than through his attorney at sentencing. °5
In State v. Thorson, 206 the court adopted a test to determine who
should decide whether a witness is an accomplice. 20 7 The court
stated that the proper rule to determine whether a witness is an
accomplice is a question of fact for the jury whenever the facts as to
his culpability are disputed or susceptible of differences. 20 8 If,
however, these facts are not disputed or susceptible of differing
inferences, the determination is a question of law for the court.20 9
In a major search and seizure opinion of the supreme court in
1978, State v. Mertens,210 the court had occasion to apply the Aguilar-
Spinelli test in determining whether information presented to a
magistrate established probable cause for issuing a search
warrant. 2 t1 Under the two prongs of that test, in order for a search
warrant to be issued upon probable cause as required by the fourth
amendment,- the magistrate, when presented with an affidavit
containing allegations of an informant, must first be informed of
some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
based his conclusions regarding the existence of illegal activity and
second, be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer-affiant concluded that the informant was credible
or that his information in this instance was reliable.21 2 In Mertens, a
search warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit of a special
investigator which stated that an informant, whom the investigator
had known for several years and who had cooperated with him in
the past, informed him that the defendant was going to receive a
package of LSD in the mail from San Francisco from a person
204. Id. at 463-65,
205. Id. at 464.
206. 264 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1978).
207. State v. Thorson, 264 N.W.2d 441, 442 (N.D. 1978).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 268N.W.2d 446(N.D. 1978).
211. State v. Mertens, 268 N.W.2d 446 (N.D. 1978).
212. Agiilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
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named Tom. 21 3 A package addressed to the defendant from T.
Mack, San Francisco, California, was observed at the Devils Lake
post office by the investigator and this information was included in
the warrant application.
21 4
The court held that the search warrant issued to seize the
package was valid. 215 Although the affidavit did not specifically
state that the informant was reliable, the court concluded that the
statement that the informant had cooperated in the past would be
the equivalent to stating he had been reliable in the past. 21 6 The
court also found that this requirement was satisfied by the
magistrate's own inquiry of the investigator before he issued the
warrant. 217 The court also stated that the arrival of the package as
described by the informant bolstered the reliability requirement .
21 8
The court did not clearly distinguish in its discussion between
the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, but it appeared to rely on
the arrival of the package as predicted by the informant to satisfy
the first prong that the magistrate must be supplied with some of
the underlying circumstances from which the informant based his
conclusions.2 1 9 Justice Vogel, in a special concurrence, differed
with the court on its reliance upon the arrival of the package,
concluding that it "is an innocent event which provides no
confirmation of the reliability of the informant. "220
EVIDENCE
One evidential question presented to the North Dakota
213. 268 N.W.2d at 448.
214. Id. at 448, 450.
215. Id. at 452-53.
216. Id. at 450.
217. Id.
218. Id.
21). The court relied in part on Draper v. United States. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In Draper, an
informant told a narcotics agent that the defendant would be arriving by train on one of two
mornings and would have three ounces of heroin in his possession. Id. at 309. He also described the
defendant. the clothes he was wearing. a bag he would be carrying, and the manner in which he
would be walking. Id. The event as forecast and described by the defendant did take place, and a
search of the defendant upon his arrest at the railway station revealed the heroin. Id. at 309-10. The
tip otthe informant along with its verification before the arrest by the agent of all the details except as
to whether the defendant actually possessed the heroin, was held to be sufficient probable cause upon
w%-hich to base a warrantless arrest. Id. at 3 14.
The United States Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969). stated
that a magistrate presented with the details described by the informant in Draper could "reasonably
infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way." The Court also stated the
Draper analysis is basically similar to that demanded to determine wlhether a search warrant should
be issued. Id. at 417 n.5. Although the prediction in .,fIeriess may not be quite as detailed as the
prediction in Draper. it is very similar and it would appear that the reliance of the court in Mertens on
the intormant's acetiracy in forecasting would not be inconsistent with the opinion in Spinell. In
Spin/li. however. the Court determined that the information provided by the informant (that the
detndant had two telephones which %%ere used for gambling purposes) was not detailed enough to
alone support probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, despite the fact the information
was verified. Id. at 418. The important question presented after Draper and Spinelli is at what point
between the two is a verified prediction by an informant detailed enough to support probable cause.
594
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Supreme Court during 1978 was whether statements made by a
third party exculpating a criminal defendant were admissible
when the third party has been deposed. The supreme court held, in
State v. Poitra,221 that such statements were not admissible since the
declarant is not "unavailable" within the purview of Rule 804 of
the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 
222
The defendant was convicted in Morton County District
Court of aggravated assault, stemming from an altercation outside
of a Mandan bar after closing. 223 The defense sought to introduce
testimony of an oral statement made by a person named Ortley
which arguably indicated that Ortley had struck the injurious blow
to the victim. 224  In a later deposition Ortley denied any
involvement. 225
The court agreed with the state's contention that even though
the statement might be otherwise admissible as a declaration
against interest exception to the hearsay rule, it was rendered
inadmissible by Ortley's subsequent deposition. 226 Rule 804 (a) (5)
specifies that a declarant is unavailable if he "is absent from the
hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means. "227
Such presence includes presence by" deposition, and therefore
Ortley was not unavailable, and his statement was not
admissible. 22
8
220. 268 N.W.2d at 456.
221. 266 N.W.2d 544 (N.D. 1978).
222. State v. Poitra, 266 N.W.2d 544, 546 (N.D. 1978). The relevant portions of N.D. R. EviD.
804 read as follows:
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailable as a witness" includes situations in which the
declarant:
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b) (2),
(3) or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by him against
another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A statement or confession offered against
the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating
both himselfand the accused, is not within this exception.
223. 266 N.W.2d at 545.
224. Id. at 545-46.
225. Id. at 545.
226. Id. at 546.
227. N.D. R. EvIn. 804 See supra note 222.
228. 266 N.W.2d at 547.
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In State v. Kroeplin22 9 the defendant appealed her Cass County
District Court conviction of reckless endangerment under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human
life. 230 The evidence indicated that the defendant had fired a rifle
into a shop in which her husband, her son and one other person
were located. 231 The defendant contended on appeal that error had
been committed by the trial court in allowing the introduction into
evidence of a rifle purportedly used in the crime, on the grounds
that the prosecution had failed to establish the chain of custody and
to lay a proper foundation for its introduction. 232 Testimony at trial
indicated that the rifle was similar to, or the same as, the rifle used
in the crime, but the evidence failed to show which officer took the
rifle to the sheriff's office, or at what time the rifle was taken
there.
23 3
In a unanimous opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, ruling that when the production of the
specific rifle is not essential to proof of the charge, and when the
admission of such an item is not unduly prejudicial, the break in
the chain of custody may affect its weight as evidence, but not its
admissibility.2 3 4 The court noted that the rifle had some relevance,
and as circumstantial evidence corroborated the testimony of other
witnesses. 235 The court further stated that the chain of possession is
much more important when the subject matter lacks individual
identifying characteristics, such as a serial number, and is subject
to easy dilution, alteration or substitution.
236
In Bauer v. Graner, 2 37 the supreme court had occasion to review
the effect and application of the presumption of due care which
arises under North Dakota law in favor of an accident victim
suffering from retrograde amnesia in circumstances where there
were no eyewitnesses to the accident.
238
The plaintiff suffered injuries, determined at trial to be
$73,000, when his motorcycle struck a pile of gravel which had
been left on the road by the defendants. 239 The trial court
229. 266 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1978).
230. State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537, 539 (N.D. 1978). The defendant was convicted of
violating N.D. CENT. CODF § 12.1-17-03 (1976).
231. 266 N.W.2d at 539.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 540.
234. Id. at 539-41.
235. Id. at 540.
236. Id.
237. 266 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1978).
238. Bauer v. Graner, 266 N.W.2d 88, 92 (N.D. 1978). The presumption of due care in this
situation was adopted in North Dakota in Thompson v. Nettum, 163 N.W.2d 91.93 (N.D. 1968).
239. 266 N.W.2d at 90-91. The condition arose when bolts broke on the rear w'heel of the
defendant's truck and part of the load ofgravel was dumped on the ground to make it easier to repair
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determined that defendants, Ray and Evelyn Graner, were 51
percent negligent and the plaintiff was 49 percent negligent.
2 40
Judgment was entered against the defendants in the amount of
$37,230 and all parties appealed.
24 1
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that once the
presumption of due care arises, it can be rebutted only by
irrefutable evidence.2 42 Such an evidentiary burden is necessary
only to overturn a finding by the trier of fact of no negligence based
on the presumption of due care,2 43 and the burden on the
defendants at trial was to show by credible evidence that it was
more likely than not that plaintiff failed to use due care. 244 The
court pointed out that such burden had been met by evidence
showing that plaintiff should have seen the gravel in time to
maneuver around it, indicating either that he attempted to jump
the pile or failed to maintain a proper lookout.
245
FAMILY LAW
North Dakota, in Becker v. Becker, 246 joined the ranks of those
states which require an initial alimony award in a divorce
settlement in order to later modify the alimony award.
Ramona and Calvin Becker were divorced in May 1975. The
settlement made no provision for alimony payments to Ramona. 2
47
After the divorce, Calvin's financial circumstances improved
substantially, while Ramona became seriously ill and was
compelled to live on welfare and foodstamps. 248 In May 1977,
the (truick. Some of the gravel had been removed and warning flags were placed around the remainder
by the county. The flags had fallen down by the time of the accident. Id. at 91. The size and location
of the gravel pile, in addition to the visual conditions surrounding it, were the subjects of factual
disputes at trial, although it was clear that a motorcycle could pass on either side of the pile and
remain on the road. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 92. The $37,230 amount was arrived at by prorating actual damages of $73,000 by
plaintif"s comparative negligence ptirstant to N.D. CENT. COD. 5 9-10-07 (1975). Id. at 91-92.
242. Id. at 92.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 93. The supreme court stated that the trial court's failure to mention the presumption
of due care in its Findings of fact and conclusions of law was not conclusive as to whether it had
properly considered the effect of the presumption. The court found evidence in the trial court's
itetnoranduin opinion denying the motion for a new trial in which it was stated that the presumption
of due care had been rebutted to the extent that the plaintiff was found 49 percent negligent that the
presumption had been properly considered. Id. at 92.
245. Id. at 93. The court affirmed the trial court judgment in all respects except as to the liability
of Evelyn Graner. Relying on Schlichenmaver v. Luithle, 221 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1974), the court
held that liability could not be predicated upon an agency relationship when the only facts in support
of such a finding were that she was married to the codefendant and that the gravel was being hauled
in connection with the operation of the farm of which she was a joint owner. Id. at 95.
246. 262 N.W.2d478 (N.D. 1978).
247. Becker v. Becker. 262 N.W.2d 478, 484 (N.D. 1978).
248. Id. at 481.
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Calvin instituted proceedings to modify the divorce decree, 249 and
Ramona responded with a request for alimony. 250 The trial court
granted this request2 5 I and Calvin appealed.
25 2
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the alimony
award because divorce jurisdiction is entirely statutory. 25 3 The only
statute which gives the court jurisdiction to grant permanent
alimony is section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code.
254
This section states that the court must made "suitable allow-
ances. . . for support" 2 5 5 at the time a divorce is granted. Further,
the "court from time to time may modify its orders in these
respects. ''256 In Becker, since the original divorce decree did not
provide for alimony, there was nothing to modify and the court had
nojurisdiction to award alimony after the initial divorce settlement.
To avoid this result, jurisdiction must be maintained by making an
initial nominal alimony award (one dollar a year) or by obtaining
an express reservation ofjurisdiction.
257
The nature of property rights was a prime issue in the case of
Nastrom v. Nastrom.258 Sharon Nastrom was divorced from Ned
Nastrom and appealed parts of the divorce decree. She contended
that division of the property was inequitable and disputed the
provision that alimony payments must cease upon her
remarriage.
259
Because Sharon had helped Ned build a successful business,
she argued that she had a property interest in Ned's income-
producing skills and therefore Ned's future earnings should be
considered in the property settlement.2 60 The court refused to term
future earnings as property because they are a tenuous
249. Id. ii 480. Calvin wisheltl o btin custody of one of' 1hIir iltre Ichih( t., reduce child
sippot payme ts, and cla.ge solie iiedical llsi llilc. pirovisiois. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. Afier i lica ing on ilthe iierits, tt trial court found thi it i"iaterial change in
circUIl stinites" had otcturrel'J usliflying tihe increase of child support payelints and aliiony, Id. at
481.
252. Id. a 480.
25:3. Id. ai 482.
254, Stection 14-05-24 ot'the Norih Dakota Century Code provides that:
WVhen a divora' is rantrd, ihe ( c rt shall inake such cq Uit alt, (Isistib tion o'the real and
personal property of the parties is may scenjust and proper, and may compel either
of tie parties to provide flo" tile maintenance of' the children of the marriage, and to
make such suitable allowan's to tilt, other pary for support during life or fbi a shorter
period as ii tile" coiirt Illy Steli (si. having regard t tithe ci rcumilslaices of lie parties
respe'tiv'ely. The cour Fro liii le to izne mom' iodfy its orders in thexse respects.
N.D. CF .N-r. CoDE § 14-05-24 (197 1) (eniphasis added).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 262 N.W .2d 478. 484. The coirt pre
6
'rs the exprCss reservation of 'iisdittion "bect.iise it
avoids tihe shabby pretense thait i nominal award is 'ist. Id.
258. 262 N.W.2d 487 (N 0. 1978).
259. Nasiroin v. Nastroin. 262 N.W.2d 487. 489 (N.D. 1978).
260. Id. at 492.
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expectation 26' at best. The court acknowledged, however, that
earning power may be considered in formulating the divorce
settlement.262
The court also refused to view the award of alimony as part of
a .. property settlement which would not terminate upon
remarriage.2 63 The test of Nugent v. Nugent,2 64 which requires that
alimony payments cease upon remarriage unless there is "some
extraordinary circumstance justifying its continuance,'' 2 65 was
upheld.
266
The court upheld the formation of an education trust as part of
a property settlement in the case of Davis v. Davis.2 67 The court
determined that each of the four minor children of the divorced
parents shall receive ten thousand dollars .to be held in trust for
education purposes. Recognizing the trend toward this type of
trust, the court suggested some factors to consider in awarding an
educational trust. These factors include the financial condition of
the parent and the family style of living as well as the growing need
for a college education or its equivalent. 2 68 In dicta, the court
indicated that it is the duty of a divorced parent to provide his or her
children with a college education. 269 In making this statement, the
duty of a divorced parent has been made greater than the duty of
non-divorced parents, who are not usually compelled to support
their children beyond the age of minority.
270
A unique custodial argument was rejected in Gardebring v.
Rizzo. 271 In that case, the divorce decree of Ingrid Gardebring and
Joseph Rizzo gave custody of their two-year-old daughter, Sophia,
to Ingrid but allowed Joseph to take Sophia to his home for one
week of every other month. 272 Because Sophia was exhibiting signs
of regression and emotional disturbance on returning from these
periodic week-long visitations, Ingrid sought to severely limit
Joseph's visitation rights. 273 Ingrid argued that once custody is
awarded, the noncustodial parent should have no legally
261. Id. at 493. In North Dakota the division of property is not subject to modification except
"in the same manner and on the same grounds as other idgments." Id. at 492.
262. Id. at 493.
263. Id. at 490-91.
264. 152 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1967).
265. Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323, 327 (N.D. 1967).
266. 262 N.W.2d at 490.
267. 268 N.W.2d 769, 778 (N.D. 1978).
268. Davis v. Davis, 268 N. W.2d 769, 778 (N.D. 1978).
269. Id.
270. An exception to this is the Relative Aid statute which requires the father, mother, or
children of any poor person unable to maintain himself by work to "maintain such person to the
extent of their ability." N.D. CENT. Co1E § 50-01-19 (1974).
271. 269 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1978).
272. Gardebringv. Rizzo, 269 NW.2d 104, 105-06(N.D. 1978).
273. Id. at 106.
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enforceable rights.2 74 The court rejected this extreme view, stating
that such a shift in policy should be a legislative decision. 275 The
compromise of the trial court, which gave Joseph a six-week period
with Sophia each summer, acknowledged the policy that visitation
rights are in the best interests of the child.
2 76
The fact that juvenile court hearings to determine child
deprivation must be separate from divorce related custody hearings
was established in the case of In Interest of T.M.M.277 In that case,
the parents of T.M.M. were divorced and the child was legally in
the custody of his mother at the time a deprivation hearing was
brought against both the child's mother and father. The juvenile
court determined that the child was deprived and placed the child
with the father. 278 The mother appealed, and the decision was
reversed and remanded. 2 79 The court stated that the juvenile court
had no jurisdiction in divorce-related custody proceedings. 280 This
decision was based on the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 28 1 which
was substantially adopted by North Dakota. The legislature chose
not to include "proceedings to determine the custody. . . of a
child" within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
282
A case arising under the Uniform Parentage Act,28 3 In Interest
of WV.M. V.,284 held that the Act applies, retroactively, to children
born prior to July 1, 1975, the effective date of the Act. 285 The
applicable statute of limitations provides that an action to
determine paternity "brought by or on behalf of a child whose
paternity has not been determined is not barred until three years
after the child reaches the age of majority.... "286
GOVERNMENT
In Schoonover v. Morton County, 28 7 the county attempted to avoid
payment to the plaintiff for gravel hauling and crushing performed
274. Id. at 110. See,]. GOLDSTEIN. A. FREI t. A. STOLNIT. BFYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHIL 38 (1973).
275. 269 N.W.2d at 110.
276. Id. at 111.
277. 267 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1978).
278. In Interest of'T.N.M.. 267 N.W.2d807. 808(N.D. 1978).
279. Id. at813.
280. Id. at 809.
281. N.D. CENT. COtDE ch. 27-20 (1977).
282. Id. at § 27-20-03 (1977).
283. N.D. CENT. COiOF ch. 14-17(1977).
284. 268 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1978).
285. In Interest of\V.A .V.. 268 N.WV.2d 781. 786 (N.D. 1978).
286. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-06 (1977).
287. 267 N.k\.2d 8t9 (N.D. 1978).
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for the county on the grounds that as the result of procedural
defects in the agreement between the plaintiff and the county
commissioners, the county commissioners did not act collectively as
required to legally bind the county to a contract. 218 The court,
holding the county liable for the reasonable value of services
performed, stated that the rule to be applied is as follows:
[A] county cannot escape liability for the reasonable valte
of services and goods obtained and retained by it through
transactions coming within the general powers of the
county and the county commissioners merely because of
procedural defects in the methods by which the goods and
services were furnished to the county.
2 89
The court also held that absent an allegation of fraud, bad
faith, collusion, or personal gain by the commissioners, they would
not be required to reimburse the county for the reasonable value of
the services performed.
290
In Sande v. City of Grand Forks,29t the supreme court construed
the "discretionary function" exception to municipal corporations
tort liability which was established by the court's prior decision in
Kitto v. Minot Park District.292 The plaintiffs in Sande alleged that the
city of Grand Forks and the Urban Renewal Agency of Grand
Forks were liable to them for damages sustained from a failure of
the Agency to act in accordance with federal regulations in
providing relocation assistance. 293 In particular, the plaintiffs
contended that the Agency failed to inform them of a substantial
revision of regulations which they could have taken advantage of
had they known of them. 294 After concluding that an Urban
Renewal Agency created by a city is a municipal corporation and,
therefore, not immune from tort liability, 295 the court held that the
Agency's actions in the case at bar were "discretionary functions"
and, thus, immune from liability. 296 The court noted that the
plaintiffs did not point to any specific requirement that the Agency
supply persons in their position with information on new rules, but
288. Schoonover v. Morton County, 267 N .W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1978).
289. Id. at 824.
290. Id. at 825.
291. 269 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1978).
292. 224 N.W.2d 795, 804-05 (N.D. 1974). In 1975 the Legislature responded to the Kitlo case
by enacting a statote limiting municipal tort liability. It was effective April 8, 1975. and Imnd at
1975 N.D. Sess. Laws.
293. Sande v. City of~rand Forks, 269 N.W.2d 93, 94 (N.D. 1978).
294. Id. at 97.
295. Id. at 96.
296. Id. at 98.
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only to "broad language" that it provide "maximum assistance"
and "informational material" to businesses displaced by the
Agency. 297 The court found that such broad language made the
Agency methods used to pass on information part of a
"discretionary function.' '298
INSURANCE
In Applegren v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Company,299 the
supreme court held that the defendant insurance company
breached its duty to defend an insured in a negligence suit. 300 The
insured retained counsel and ultimately settled its part of the case
after the insurance company refused to defend them. 301 The court
held the insurance company liable for the insured's cost of its
defense and for the amount for which it settled the claim. 30 2 In
response to the insurer's arguments that it did not have a duty to
defend in this particular action, the court examined only the
plaintiff's complaint and concluded that it stated allegations that
would support a recovery against the insured upon a risk covered
by the insurance policy. 30 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court
found that a purported exclusion in the policy was ambiguous and,
therefore, did not consider it in-determining whether a duty to
defend existed. 3
0 4
In Everson v. Partners Life Insurance Company,305 the court held
that the account between a life insurance company and a general
agent of the company was a mutual account. 30 6 Therefore, the
statute of limitations did not bar claims on items which entered the
account more than six years before the action was commenced so
long as the latest item in the account was less than six years old.
The court pointed out that the account was not a general account
because there was an entitlement to periodic payments and
periodic, although disputed, deductions, and payments from it to
the Internal Revenue Service.
30 7
297. Id. at 97.
298. Id. at 97-98.
299. 268 N.W.2d 114(N.D. 1978).
300. Applegren %. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 114,119 (N.D. 1978).
301. Id. at 115.
302. Id. at 119.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 268 N.W.2d 794 (N.D. 1978).





The court decided three important cases involving mineral
leases in 1978. Taurus Corporation v. Roman Yourk Equity Pure Trust
30 8
interpreted the statute30 9 establishing the procedure for removing
mineral leases from public record by the lessor. The statute
provides that the owner give the lessee notice that the lease has been
forfeited. 310 The lessee then has twenty days to give notice in
writing to the register of deeds in the county where the real
property is located that the lease has not been forfeited. 311 If the
lessee does not give notice within twenty days, the lessor can file an
affidavit with the register of deeds and when the affidavit is
recorded, the record of the lease does not constitute notice to the
public of the lease.
312
The initial question the court determined was whether the
lessee, Taurus Corporation, (Taurus), gave timely notice to the
register of deeds that they disputed the forfeiture of the lease.
31 3
Taurus contended that the twenty day period should begin when
they actually received the forfeiture notice via registered mail.
31 4
The court held that the date of mailing by the lessor was the date of
service. 31 5 Since Taurus mailed its notice of dispute of forfeiture to
the register of deeds twenty-two days after service of the notice of
forfeiture, Taurus' notice of dispute of forfeiture was not timely.
Next, Taurus challenged the constitutionality of the same
statute on the ground that it violates due process to allow the lessor
to select a method of service when that selection could vary the
number of days for the lessee to respond. 31 6 The court noted that
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provide for additional
time for a party to act when service is by mail.3 t However, the
court stated that the legislature had the power when enacting the
statute to set any reasonable period of time to require the lessee to
308. 264 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1978).




313. Taurus Corp. v. Roman Yourk Equity Pure Trust, 264 N.W.2d 688, 690 (N.D. 1978).
314. Id. at 691.
315. Id. The court construed the language of the statute as folows:
the lessee has 20 days from the date of personal service, 20 days from the date of
tailing of certified or registered mail, or 20 days from the date of first publication of
the notice to give its notice to the register of deeds. The word "registration" thus is
construed to mean the date oftn ailing of certified or registered mail.
Id.
316. Id
317. N.D. R. Ct.'. P. 6 (c) provides that "w~henever a part' has the right or is rec4 orcl to cfo
some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper ipon fiim by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period."
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give notice to the register of deeds. 318 The court found that Taurus
had eighteen days to give notice of their dispute of forfeiture, which
the court found to be a reasonable amount of time.
31 9
Finally, Taurus contended that a judicial determination that
the lease is terminated or forfeited is a prerequisite for proceeding
under the statute. The court correctly looked to the true purpose of
the statute and determined that such a judicial determination was
not a prerequisite. 320 The statute was enacted to provide a simple
method for landowners to remove a cloud from their title without
going to court. 32 1 If a lessee disputes the forfeiture of the lease he
can give notice to the register of deeds within the required time,
which entitles the landowners to remedies provided by law for the
cancellation of a disputed lease.
322
The court interpreted the Surface Owner Protection Act 323 in
North American Coal Corporation v. Huber.324 Huber owned a 1/64th
remainderman interest in the surface and a vested remainderman
interest in 1/64th of seventy-five percent of the coal. 325 All the
remaindermen except Huber ratified a lease made by the life estate
holder and the owner of the remaining twenty-five percent of the
coal interests to North American. 326 North American sought a
court order pursuant to section 38-18-06 (5) of the North Dakota
Century Code to have the Public Service Commission issue a
permit so North American could use the surface for mining
operations without the consent of the surface owners and without
the developer acquiring all the mineral interests.
327
The order requested by North American can only be sought by
a mineral owner or a mineral developer. 328 Thus, the critical
question before the court was whether North American was either a
mineral developer or a mineral owner.3 29 A mineral owner is "any
person who owns the mineral estate under a specified tract of land
by means of a mineral deed. "330 Since North American acquired
318. 264 N.W.2d at 692.
319. Id. The court carefIly littitd its holding to tile l S t tl this catse and left unsettled tile issue
ofwhcthr a It ssec Could ever be deprived ofd(LUc process by application ott he statuLte. Id.
320. Id. at 693.
321. Id.
322. Id. See N.D. CENT. Coo. .§ 47-16-37 (1977).
323. N.D. CENT. CODE '11. 38-18 (Supp. 1975).
324. 268 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 1978).
325. North Att. Coal Corp. v. Huber. 268 N.XV.2d 593. 595 (N.D. 1978).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. N.D. CENT. CODE :38-18-06(5) (Supp. 1975) provides in part: -'ifthe mineralowner or the
mineral developer is unable to obtain tile stt rfLt'c lac e, rsei 'st Set. the mineral ott-ner or mineral developer
may bring an action ... (emphasis added).
329. 268 N.W.2d at 597.
330. N.D. C ENT. CoDF § 38-18-05(7)(Sit pp. 1975).
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their interest in the coal through a lease, the court found it did not
qualify as a mineral owner a.3 3 A mineral developer is "the person
who acquires the mineral rights or lease for the purpose of extracting
or using the mineral for non-agricultural purposes." '332 The court
noted a distinction between acquiring a mineral right and a
mineral estate, 333 and found that "[i]f the Legislature had intended
to permit a person to proceed as a mineral developer with only a
part of the minerals, it would have defined a mineral developer as one
who acquired a 'mineral interest' and not one who acquired 'the
mineral rights' ,,.a33 Therefore, the court held that section 38-18-06
(5) of the North Dakota Century Code can be used only when there
is a dispute between the entire mineral interest and the severed
surface interest.
33 5
In Nodland v. Plainsmen Petroleum, Inc. 33 6 the court was
confronted with the question of whether an option agreement in a
coal lease related back to the time of the filing of the option for the
purpose of establishing a priority against the landowner.
337
Nodland executed a coal lease with Plainsmen Petroleum, Inc.,
under the mistaken impression that he owned coal under the sur-
face. 338 Natural Gas Pipelines (NGP) acquired some rights in the
Nodland lease, including an option agreement from Star Drilling,
an assignee of the Nodland lease, on January 25, 1973. 339 NGP
registered its option agreement in the register of deeds office on
January 31, 1973.340 Nodland learned of his mistaken belief in
December 1974 and executed a notice of recission of the lease on
July 31, 1975.341 The option was exercised by NGP on December
28, 1976, after receiving notice of the recission.
34
The court held that the exercise of the option to purchase the
leasehold interest related back to the time of the filing of the option
which made NGP a good faith purchaser, for value of the
leasehold. 343
331. 268 N.W.2d at 597.
332. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-18-05(4) (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
333. 268 N.W.2d at 597. A mineral estate is "an estate in or ownership of-all or part of the
minerals under a specified tract of land." N.D. CENT. CODE §38-18-05(5) (Supp. 1975) (emphasis
added).




336. 265 N.W.2d 252 (N.D. 1978).
337. Nodland v. Plainsmen Petroleum, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 252, 254 (N.D. 1978).
338. Id. at 254. The mineral rights had been reserved by the previous owners. However, Skjod,
an agent for Plainsmen Petroleum, Inc., told Nodland that coal rights and mineral rights were two
separate things. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 255.
341. Id. at 254.
342. Id. at 254-55.
343. Id. at 256. There was no contention that NGP had notice ofa claim by Nodland at the time
of the filing of the option agreement. Id.
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
An attorney whose certificate of admission to the North
Dakota Bar was revoked in 1972 petitioned for reinstatement in
McKinnon v. Disciplinary Board of Supreme Court.344 The court stated
that mere passage of time and penitence are not sufficient grounds
for reinstatement 345 and recommended six elements which could be
considered in an application for reinstatement. The elements
include the following:
1. Strict compliance with the disciplinary order.
2. Evidence of unimpeachable character.
3. Clear evidence of a good reputation for pro-
fessional ability.
4. Evidence of lack of malice and ill feeling toward
those involved in bringing the disciplinary proceedings.
5. Personal assurances of sense of repentance and
desire to conduct practice in exemplary fashion in the
future.
6. Restitution of funds.
346
The court further required the attorney to successfully retake the
North Dakota Bar Examination.
3 47
PROPERTY
The supreme court decided three important cases pertaining
to public taking of private property. Oakes Municipal Airport Authority
v. Wiese3 48 involved two different condemnation proceedings
against the same defendant for some of the same land. 349 The first
condemnation proceeding was begun by Oakes Municipal Airport
Authority (Oakes) on December 12, 1975. Oakes at-
tempted to take 74.1 acres of Weise's land for use as an airport. 350
The trial court entered a judgment dismissing Oakes' suit with
prejudice on October 20, 1976, because Oakes had "failed to
establish public use, public necessity and the proper selection of
property sought to be condemned so as to entitle it to the exercise of
eminent domain and condemnation. "351 Oakes began a second
344. 264 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1978).
345. McKinnon v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court, 264 N.W.2d. 448. 449 (N.D. 1978).
346. Id. at 449-50. The elements were adopted in In Re The Florida Bar, 301 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla.
1974).
347. 264 N.W.2d at 452.
348. 265 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1978).





condemnation proceeding against Weise on June 27, 1977, to take
37.93 acres for the airport, plus a clear zone easement in 9.18 acres
for air navigation purposes. 35 2 The Dickey County District Court
granted Weise's motion for dismissal on the ground of res
judicata.
35 3
Oakes raised two issues on appeal to the North Dakota
Supreme Court. First, Oakes contended that the taking of land by
an airport authority is automatically a public necessity;35 4 therefore
the October 20, 1976, district court dismissal was void because the
district court lacked jurisdiction to determine public necessity of a
proposed taking by an airport authority. 3 5 The court found that
the necessity of a taking by an airport authority is subject to court
review. Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction to decide the
question of public necessity of a taking by an airport authority.
35 6
The court restated that a court's review of public necessity is
limited to whether the particular property sought to be condemned
is reasonably suited and usable for the authorized public use. 357
Next, Oakes sought a determination that the doctrine of res
judicata did not bar a subsequent action by a condemning
authority to acquire some of the same land which was denied in a
previous action. 358 The court held that a subsequent action would
not be barred if the following criteria were established: (1) the
subsequent action was brought in good faith, and (2) circumstances
have changed so that the subsequent action is not "merely an
attempt to relitigate identical issues based upon identical factors for
consideration.' 3 59 The court applied the facts of the case to this test
and determined that the passage of time coupled with the reduction
in the amount of acreage sought and a lack of showing of bad faith
by Oakes precluded the application of the doctrine of res judicata to
the second condemnation action. 360
In Amoco Oil Company v. State Highway Department361 the court
utilized a diversion of the Mouse River by the Corps of Engineers
352. Id.
353. Id. at 699.
354. Id. N.D. CENT. COnE §2-06-17 (1975) provides in part:
[T~he planning, acquisition, establishment, development, construction, im-
provetnent, maintenance, equipment, operation, regulation, and protection of air-
ports and air navigation facilities.., are hereby declared to be public and govern-
mental functions, exercised for the public purpose, and matters of public necessity.
355. 265 N.W.2d at 699.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 700.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 701.
360. Id.
361. 262 N.W.2d 726 (N.D. 1978).
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to determine the owner of a riverbed of a non-navigable river.
362
The North Dakota State Highway Department (State) offered to
purchase several lots owned by Amoco Oil Company (Amoco)
adjacent to the Mouse River and pursuant to that offer deposited
$73,000 in the Ward County District Court. 363 Amoco appealed
the amount to district court where it was awarded an additional
$53,000 of which $23,000 was for Amoco's interest in the
riverbed. 364 At the time of the trial the Mouse River was no longer
in the area because of the diversion. 
365
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the owner's land
extended to the center of a non-navigable river. 366 The State argued
that Amoco did not own to the center of the stream because a
contrary intent was shown by the use of the term "bank" in the
property description.3 67  The court found this argument
unpersuasive and based its holding on a North Dakota statute
which provides that "[i]n all cases when the opposite banks of any
stream not navigable belong to different persons, the stream and
the bed thereof shall become common to both. "368 The court
reasoned that since the statute provided that the owner of the bank
owns the riverbed; the necessary contrary intention must be shown
by something other than the use of the word "bank" in the
property description. 
369
In Lee v. North Dakota Park Service,370 the court reviewed the
concepts of a license and a lease to determine the rights of the
plaintiff, Lee, in an inverse condemnation action.3 71 Lee obtained a
"lease" for a site to run a resort within the Fort Stevenson
Recreational Area from the Garrison Park District (Garrison),
which had been granted a "license" for the property from the
United States, through the Department of the Army (Army). 372
The Army granted a "lease" to the North Dakota Park Service




366. Id. at 730.
367. Id. at 728. The applicable part of the description was as follows:
thence west at right angle to said sec. line 133 ft. to the left bank of the Mouse River
thence down stream along said left bank. . . thence running WEST at right angles to
the last described line, a distance ofeighty-six feet (86) to the east bank of the MOUSE
RIVER; thence meandering SOUTHERLY along the said EAST BANK....
Id. at 727.
368. N.D. CENT. CODE §47-01-15 (1978) (emphasis added).
369. 262 N.W.2d at 730.
370. 262 N.W.2d 467 (N.D. 1978).
371. Lee v. North Dakota Park Service, 262 N.W.2d 467 (N.D. 1978).
372. Id. at 468. The court noted that the substance rather than the title of the instrument would
determine whether the transaction was a "lease" or a "license. " Id. at 474.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 609
(Park Service) to use parts of the same area for public parks and
recreational purposes. 373 The Park Service eliminated a roadway
from the Fort Stevenson Park Area to Lee's Resort thereby
increasing the driving distance between the two from 700 feet to 2.5
miles. 374 The District Court of McLean County awarded $9,310.00
as damages to Lee for inverse condemnation resulting from the
elimination of the roadway.
375
The basic issue confronting the court was whether the
elimination of the road gave rise to any relief for the taking of
private property.37 6 The resolution of this question required the
court to determine the rights that Lee acquired from Garrison,
which in turn required a determination of the rights Garrison
acquired from the Army.37 7 Following a detailed discussion of the
distinction between a lease and a license, the court concluded that a
lease conveys exclusive possession to the lessee, while a license
grants permission to the licensee to use the land subject to certain
conditions and restrictions. 378 Applying these conclusions to the
instrument granted by the Army to Garrison, the court found the
instrument was a license.
379
In determining the rights Lee acquired from Garrison, the
court noted that he would not have acquired any greater rights than
Garrison acquired from the Army.380 The court found thaf Lee
received a concession agreement and equated the rights acquired
thereunder to those of a license. 38I The court determined that a
license was not private property subject to just compensation, 38 2
and accordingly the concession agreement that Lee acquired from




The North Dakota Supreme Court decided several noteworthy
tort cases during 1978 involving civil duty and the standard of care.
373. Id. at469. Seesupra note 372.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 468.
376. Id. at 469. N.D. CONST. §14 provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid into court for
the owner. "
377. 262 N.W.2d at 469.
378. Id. at 473.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 474.
381. Id. at 476.
382. Id. at 474.
383. Id. at 478.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
In Kirton v. Williams Electric Cooperative, 384 a summary
judgment entered by the Williams County District Court against
the plaintiff in a wrongful death action against an electric power
distributor was overturned on appeal. 38 5 The plaintiff's decedent
was electrocuted when a citizen's band radio antenna which she
was attempting to install came into contact with defendant's
uninsulated 7,200 volt overhead powerline. 386 The trial court ruled
that as a matter of law the defendant was under no duty to guard
against the injury, since the defendant could not be expected to
anticipate that a person would negligently attempt to install an
antenna on a windy day in a manner in which it could come into
contact with the powerline.
38 7
In remanding for a trial on the merits, the court stated that a
North Dakota power distributor is under a duty to exercise all care
commensurate with the danger involved. 38 The court held that if it
can be reasonably foreseen that persons may come into contact with
the line, even though the exact manner in which an injury may oc-
cur is unanticipated, the power distributor is under a duty to
insulate the powerline or give a proper warning of the dangers
involved.
38 9
Although the question of duty may be a matter of law,
foreseeability is a jury question in North Dakota when reasonable
minds may differ as to the facts or inferences that can reasonably be
drawn from the facts. 390 In this case, the court pointed to factual
disputes concerning whether the decedent had been properly
warned of the dangers of the powerline which ran above the trailer
park in which she lived, and whether the power company had or
should have had notice as to other antennae in the area which could
have reasonably come into contact with the line.3 91 The court also
noted that differing inferences could be drawn from the undisputed
fact that the powerline was in compliance with the minimum
standards of the National Electrical Safety Code. 3
92
The supreme court also explicitly noted that it is rarely
appropriate to grant a summary judgment in negligence cases; a
summary judgment should be denied when there "exists the
384. 265 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1978).
385. Kirton v. Williams Elec. Coop., 265 N.W.2d 702, 708 (N.D. 1978).
386. Id. at 703.
387. Id. at 703-4.
388. Id. at 704.
389. Id. at 705.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 706-7.
392. Id. at 707. Compliance with the National Electrical Safety Code was correctly noted not tc
be dispositive of the issue of negligence by the power distributor. Id.
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slightest doubt as to a factual dispute or a 'genuine issue of
fact!' ' ,393
In Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 39 4 the court upheld the
submission to the jury of the issue of jailer negligence in an action
stemming from the suicide-death of plaintiff's decedent in the
Bismarck City Jail, and affirmed judgments against the city of
Bismarck and a Bismarck police sergeant totalling $58,000.
395
The decedent had been unable to post bond for a DWI charge
and was placed in the "hole" after allegedly foulmouthing a
policeman. 396 The "hole," where decedent was found the following
morning hanging by his T-shirt, consisted of a small room in the
basement of the jail, bare except for a toilet bowl.
397
The court first noted that suicide is only actionable when it
results from an uncontrollable impulse caused by a mental
condition induced by the conduct of the tortfeasor. 398  The
defendants argued that since there had been no showing that the
decedent was suicidal before being placed in the "hole," the death
was not foreseeable, and there could not have been a duty owed to
the decedent to protect against the suicide.
399
In rejecting this argument, the North Dakota Supreme Court
pointed out that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could conclude the death was foreseeable. 40 0 The fact that the
decedent was intoxicated increased the risk, and therefore the
foreseeability. 40 1 Additionally the jury could have found a breach of
duty by the jailer's failure to observe and supervise the decedent. 4
02
Moreover the jury could have found the suicide foreseeable solely
on the basis of jail regulations which require each prisoner to be
stripped of his belt, shoelaces and necktie prior to being placed in a
cell. 40 3 Also these rules have the stated purpose of preventing self-
393. 265 N.W.2d at 705-6 (quoting with approval from Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm
Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388, 389 (8th Cir. 1968)).
The trial court's summary judgment also extended to the allegation in the complaint that the
powerline constituted a public nuisance. The court held that the existence or non-existence of a
nuisance could not be determined on the record which evidenced significant factual disputes and
competing inferences. 265 N.W.2d at 707-8.
394. 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978).
395. Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 789, 794 (N.D. 1978). Jury verdicts
were returned against the City of Bismarck on the wrongful death count in the amount of $27,000,
and against the Bismarck police sergeant in the civil rights action (42 U.S.C. § 1983) in the amount
of $25,000 in actual damages and $6,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 789.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 790.
399. Id. at 791. The court correctly noted that the absence of prior suicidal tendencies only rein.
forced the argument that the death was caused by negligently placing the decedent in the "hole." Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 791-92.
402. Id. at 792.
403. Id. at 791.
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inflicted injuries to the prisoners. 40 4
The court upheld the award of punitive damages because the
jury could have concluded that the decedent was placed in the
"hole" as a result of the officer's anger, or that decedent should
have been detained in the "hole" for a shorter period of time, or
that he should not have been placed there at all.
4 0 5
In Kirchoffner v. Quam, 40 6 the question of whether a fifteen
year old boy should be held to an adult standard of care while
engaged in golfing was explicitly left open by the supreme court.
40 7
The Cass County District Court found the Maple River Golf Club
70 percent negligent, the plaintiff 30 percent negligent, and
defendant Quam, not negligent in an action arising from an
incident at the Maple River Golf Club. 408 Plaintiff was in a boat on
the river which wound its way through the course when Quam's tee
shot began to hook to the left. 40 9 The cries of "fore" were
insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from being struck in the eye. 410
In affirming the judgment, the court stated that the question of
whether Quam should have been held to an adult standard of care
was not properly before the court for resolution since it had not
been presented before the verdict at trial. 4 1' The Golf Club's
attorneys first raised the issue in a motion for a new trial. 411
Although the trial judge did not request exceptions to the proposed
jury instructions, which resulted in their being deemed excepted to,
the court held that the question relating to the change of law could
be preserved for appeal only by presenting it to the trial judge for
resolution before the verdict had been rendered. 414 Although the
court did "express doubt" as to whether it would hold minors
engaged in golfing to an adult standard of care, it proclaimed its
willingness to consider, in a properly presented case, whether a
404. Id.
405. Id. at 793-94.
406. 264 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1978).
407. Kirchoffner v. Quam, 264 N.W.2d 203, 205 (N.D. 1978).
408. Id. at 205.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 206-207. The trial court gave the following instruction pertaining to the standard of
care for a minor:
The court instructs the jury that negligence, as applied to a minor child, is the
doing of that which an ordinarily prudent person of the age, intelligence, experience
and capacity of such child would not do under the same or similar circumstances, or
the failure to do that which an ordinarily prudent person of the age, intelligence, ex-
perience, and capacity of said child would do under the same or similar circumstances.
Id. at 205.
412. Id. at 206.
413. Id. at 206. The judge can so proceed pursuant to Rule 51 (c) of the North Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure.
414. 264 N.W.2d at 207.
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In Matter of Estate of Wagner,416  the court clarified the
applicability of a presumption of undue influence in the execution
of a will.417 Freddie E. Wagner executed two wills.418 A 1970 will
left his estate to his wife Ruth, but if Ruth predeceased Freddie the
estate would go to his natural daughter, Lee Evelyn Kraft (Lee),
and his stepchildren and step grandchildren. 41 9 The second will was
executed on May 30, 1973, and left the entire estate to Lee. 420 The
1973 will was admitted to probate by the Williams County Court
with increased jurisdiction; however the three living stepchildren
(contestants) filed a petition to revoke probate of the will. 421 The
Williams County Court determined the 1973 will was a result of
undue influence and admitted the 1970 will to probate. 422 On
appeal, the Williams County District Court granted a new trial, 423
and ajury verdict upheld the 1973 will. 424
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the
contestants contended that the court should clarify its holding in
Stormon v. Weiss, 425 and adopt a rule presuming undue influence
and shifting the burden of proof to the proponent of a will when the
following are shown: (a) a confidential relationship between the
proponent and testator, (b) participation in the preparation or
procurement of the will by the proponent, and (c) a substantial
bequest to -the proponent by the terms of the will. 426 The court
noted that the facts in Stormon "cast upon the proponent the burden
of going forward with the evidence to overcome the inference of
undue influence. ,,427 The court distinguished an inference
415. Id.
416. 265 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1978).
417. Matter of Estate ofWagner, 265 N.W. 2d 459, 460 (N.D. 1978). An earlier decision of the
North Dakota Supreme Court gave support to the possibility that there could he a presumption of
undue influence in the execution ofa will. See Storman v. Weiss, 65 N .W.2d 475 (N.D. 19541).
418. 265 N.W.2d at 460.
419. Id. There were five stepchildren: Berta Collings Miller, Shirley Collings Green, Lola
Collins Hayden, Conrad Collings, and Glen Collings. Id.
420. Id. The second will was drawn after the testator received advice frir drafting a second will
which would revoke the 1970 will, leaving the estate to his natural daughter. The advice was given by





425. 65 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1954).
426. 265 N.W.2d at 462.
427. Id. at 464 (citing Storman v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 519 (N. D. 1954)(emphasis added).
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from a presumption "in that an inference is a permissive
deduction, while a presumption is a deduction directed to be drawn
by law. ",428 The court found this distinction especially applicable to
North Dakota because of its use of statutory presumptions.
429
Accordingly, the court refused to establish a presumption of undue
influence by judicial decree and stated that such a presumption
should be established by legislative act. 430 The court did note that at
some time it may adopt a presumption by judicial decree;
however the facts of this case "[did] not warrant, nor. . . create a
judicial or equitable necessity for the adoption of the rule of
presumption suggested by the contestants in this case. "431
DECISIONS AFTER AUGUST 15, 1978"*
Knoefler Honey Farms v. Just432 affirmed a decision of the
Burleigh County District Court which held that no court had
jurisdiction to review an appeal from an order of the Commissioner
of Agriculture when he was acting under his authority to regulate
bee-keeping.433 The supreme court failed to clearly state the basis
for its affirmance. Apparently it agreed with the district court,
which concluded that prior decisions required that no appeal be
permitted from any administrative agency unless the appeal was
authorized by some statute other than the Administrative Agencies
Practice Act. 434 Or it may have held that the commissioner was not
an administrative agency when regulating bee-keepers because his
orders were not "by statute. . . subject to review in the courts of
this state."435 Whatever the basis, the decision ignores the plain
language of section 28-32-15 of the North Dakota Century Code
which provides that "[a]ny party to any proceeding heard by an
administrative agency... may appeal from such decision.... 436
The district court and the supreme court relied upon dicta
from two older cases. 437 There had been no hearing in either of
428. 265 N.W.2d at 463.
429. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-03 (1976).
430. 265 N.W.2d at 465.
431. Id.
** This section is authored by Robert Vogel, Professor of Law, University of North Dakota
School of Law. The assistance of student assistants Gerri Gillund, Dan Hovland, and Chad LeDtc is
acknowledged, but they are not responsible for commentary on the cases discussed. This section
begins with a discussion of three important cases and concludes with a discussion in the format of the
previous section.
432. 270 N.W.2d 354 (N.D. 1978).
433. Knoefler Honey Farms v.Just, 270 N.W.2d 354, 358 (N.D. 1978).
434. N.D. CENT. CoE ch. 28-32 (Supp. 1977).
435. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(l) (Supp. 1977).
436. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-15 (1974).
437. See, Dakota Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r. of Ins., 79 N.D. 97, 54 N.W.2d 745 (1952);
Krueger v. Am. Christian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 N.D. 436, 43 N.W.2d 676 (1950).
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those cases, so section 28-32-15 was inapplicable to those decisions
and was not discussed. In Dakota National Insurance Co. v.
Commissioner of Insurance,43 8 the commissioner, without a hearing,
had refused to license an insurance company. Since no other appeal
or remedy was provided by law, the supreme court allowed the
company to proceed by mandamus. In Krueger v. American Christian
MutualLife Insurance Co. 411 the commissioner asked the district court
for an order to show cause why he should not take possession of the
assets of an allegedly insolvent insurance company, again without
an administrative hearing. In both cases the supreme court held
that no applicable law required a hearing at the administrative
level, and there was no hearing held. Section 28-32-15, which by its
terms gives a right of appeal when a hearing has been held, was not
discussed in either case, nor was it discussed in Knoefler. It seems,
however, that it should have been discussed and applied to allow
the appeal in Knoefler.
The long term importance of Knoefler is that hereafter no
appeal will be allowed from determinations of administrative
agencies, unless specific authority for the appeal can be found in
statutes other than the Administrative Agencies Practice Act.
While most statutes setting up state agencies contain provisions for
appeals, 440 some do not. 441 It seems intolerable that any person
licensed to engage in these occupations, whose license is suspended
or revoked by an administrative agency, has no right of appeal.
The constitutionality of a provision of a licensing act which
deprives some persons of a right of appeal allowed, to others would
seem to be doubtful.
In fact Knoefler appears to cast doubt on the supreme court's
recent decision in N.D. Real Estate Commission v. Allen, 442 in which a
real estate broker appealed from a decision of the commission
revoking his license. 443 The court found the commission to be an
administrative agency, whose decisions are subject to review under
the Agencies Administrative Practice Act. While section 43-23-1 1.1
(3) of the North Dakota Century Code provides that the provisions
of chapter 28-32 shall apply to appeal procedures before the
438. 79 N.D. 97, 54 N.W.2d 745 (1952).
439. 77 N.D. 436, 43 N.W.2d 676 (1950).
440. See, N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-08-14 (1972) (Industrial Commission); N.D. CENT. CODE 5
43-13-26, 43-15-41, 43-17-32 (1978) (appeals from the refusal, revocation or suspension of licenses of
optometrists, pharmacists and physicians respectively); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-05-12 (1978) (Public
Service Commission); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-36-17 (1972) (Tax Commissioner's orders relating to
tobacco products); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-01 (Supp. 1977) (Workmen's Compensation Bureau).
441. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 43-35 (1978) (water well contractors); N.D. CENT. CoDE ch. 43-
37 (1978) (audiologists and speech pathologists).
442. 271 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 1978).
443. North Dakota Real Estate Comm'n. v. Allen, 271 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 1978).
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commission, this is not a statute independent of the Administrative
Agencies Practice Act, as the court seems to require in Knoefler.
In Knoefler, the court suggests that one who loses after a
hearing and has no right of appeal, as in that case, may raise his
issues by either mandamus or declaratory judgment action. But
neither of these is a real alternative. The purpose of a writ of
mandamus is to compel some action, and it cannot be used to
compel discretion to be exercised a certain way. 444 And no person
has a right to proceed by declaratory judgment, since the trial
courts have discretion to refuse to accept such actions.
445
It is respectfully suggested that no agency should have the
power to deprive a person of his licensed occupation without
allowing access to the courts, whether his occupation is audiologist,
real estate broker, or something else. Therefore, either the supreme
court should reverse Knoefler, and allow appeals from orders issued
after hearings as section 28-32-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides, or the legislature should do one of three things: (1)
make clear its intention that section 28-32-15 applies; or (2) amend
all statutes relating to agencies, administrative or otherwise, to
make clear that appeals from their decisions are permitted; or (3)
provide by general law for such appeals. Until something of the
kind is done, the constitutionality of the denial of all appeals in such
cases will remain doubtful.
The court's decision in Bartels v. City of Williston446 applies
"pure" comparative negligence, rather than the modified
comparative negligence 447 required by statute 448 under certain
circumstances. 449  These circumstances involved two joint
tortfeasors, one of whom was given a release by the plaintiff, and a
third party claim of the non-released tortfeasor against the released
tortfeasor for contribution.
The court was faced with the problem of attempting to
reconcile inconsistent provisions of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act 450  and the comparative negligence
444. N.D. CENT. Coot- § 32-34-01 (1976). See Mogaard v. Garrison, 47 N.D. 468, 182 N.W.
758(1921).
445. N.D. CENT. Co)t. § 32-23-06 (1976). See State v. Divide County, 68 N.D. 708, 283 N.W.
184(1938).
446. 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979).
447. Modified negligence statutes, such as North Dakota's, allow a plaintiffto recover in spite of
his own negligence, but only if his negligence is "not as great as" (the North Dakota language) or
'not more than" the negligence of the defendant. Under a North Dakota-type rule a plaintiff
recovers nothing if his negligence is fifty percent or more of the total, but he recovers fifty-one
percent if his negligence is forty-nine percent of the total damages. Under a pure comparative
negligence, lie would recover fifty percent of his damages if lie was fifty percent at fault. twenty-five
percent if seventy-five percent itt fault. etc.
448. N.D. CENT. CoOF § 9-10-07 (1975).
449. Bartels v. City of'Williston. 276 N.W.2d 113. 115 (ND. 1979).
450. N.D. CENT. Cotiw ch. 32-38 (1976).
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statute. 45 1 It chose to follow the lead of Minnesota and Wisconsin,
from which our comparative negligence statute was adapted, and
apply pure comparative negligence under these circumstances.
This decision, which splendidly resolves a difficult problem,
necessarily finds that part of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act 452 was impliedly repealed by the enactment of sec-
tion 9-10-07. 45 3 Its import is that it may foreshadow an extension
of pure comparative negligence, which may represent the wave of
the future.
454
In Reiling v. Bhattacharyya,455 the supreme court clarified the
rule regarding retroactive application of statutes. 456 The court has
consistently held that substantive statutes are to be applied only
prospectively; 457 but as this opinion recognizes, it has been
inconsistent in its holdings as to whether procedural statutes are to
be applied retroactively 45 8 or only prospectively. 4 59 The court has
now decided that hereafter all statutes, procedural as well as
substantive, are to be applied prospectively, unless the legislature
clearly expresses that they are to be applied retroactively. 460 This
new rule provides a clear, and readily applicable guide for the
practitioner in advising clients, and is therefore welcome.
Some problems will arise, however. It is very likely that the
legislature will continue to legislate without specific reference to the
rule, expecting that the legislation will affect pending cases, or
indifferent to whether an intention to require retroactive effect
should be specified. Some legislation will be noncontroversial or
remedial, and it will seem a hardship not to apply it when the
legislative provision seems appropriate. This is a necessary
consequence of an absolute rule. Although the supreme court did
not discuss the possibility in the Reiling opinion, it has the power to
adopt its own rules for procedural matters and entirely disregard
legislative attempts to legislate on procedure in judicial matters.
The latest revision of the judicial article of the North Dakota
Constitution gives' the supreme court the sole power to prescribe
451. N.D. CENT: CODE § 9-10-07 (1975).
452. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04(i) (1976).
453. 276 NW.2d at 121.
454. Pure comparative negligence has been adopted by judicial interpretation in California. See,
Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).
455. 276 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1979).
456. Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, 276 N.W.2d 237, 240 (N.D. 1979).
457. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10(1975).
458. 276 N.W.2d at 239-40. See N.D. Real Estate Comm'n. v. Allen, 271 N.W.2d 593 (N.D.
1978); In re Foster's Estate 89 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1958).
459. 276 N.W.2d at 240. SeeYoungv. White, 267 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1978).
'460. 276 NW.2d at 240-41.
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rules of procedure of the courts.4 61 In fact, legislation regardin!
judicial procedure is unconstitutional. 
462
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Steel v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 463 thc
court again pointed out that the applicable standard of review by a
district court or the supreme court of an administrative agency
decision was changed in the 1977 legislature464 from "substantial
evidence" to "preponderance of the evidence. "465 Thus, it would
appear that the courts' role has changed from merely determining
whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the
agency to weighing the evidence to determine whether it
preponderates over conflicting evidence. Presumably, it can be
expected that more agency decisions will be reversed than in the
past.
In the same case the court reiterated the requirement that rules
promulgated by administrative agencies may not exceed the
authority granted them by statute.
466
The opinion also held that attorney fees on appeal would not
be allowed to an unsuccessful claimant who did not prevail on the
appeal. 467 This was contrary to established practice of the Bureau,
which successfully sought a new statute from the legislature
reestablishing its policy of paying attorney fees on appeal except
when the appeal is frivolous.
468
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The court had occasion to determine whether a co-defendant
retailer, whom the jury found not liable in a strict liability action,
could recover his attorney's fees and costs from the manufacturer,
who was found to be fifty percent liable. This situation was
presented in Conrad v. Suhr, 469 and the court determined that the
retailer could not recover his attorney's fees and costs. 470 The result
461. N.D. CONST. art. 4, § 87.
462. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
463. 273 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1978).
464. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-32-21 (Supp. 1977).
465. Steele v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 696 (N.D. 1978).
466. Id. at 701.
467. Id. at 703.
468. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-03 (Supp. 1979).
469. 274 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1979).
470. Conrad v. Suhr, 274 N.W.2d 571, 578 (N.D. 1979).
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has been modified by the legislature, which provided that under
some circumstances the retailer is entitled to recover.4 71
This case may be more important because of an issue that was
settled while the appeal was pending and did not reach the supreme
court. The suit was commenced on the three theories of products
liability: negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort. 472 The
first two grounds were dismissed, leaving only strict liability in
tort. 473 The jury found the manufacturers fifty percent responsible,
and attributed the remaining responsibility to the plaintiff's
contributory negligence. 474 If the verdict had been based on
negligence, the plaintiff would have received nothing, because
comparative negligence of fifty percent or more bars recovery.
4 75
Since the verdict was based on strict liability in tort, judgment was
entered for fifty percent of the damages of $300,000, or $150,000.
It is apparent that the district court applied the rule of some other
states requiring the jury to translate the contribution of the
defendant into fault terms, even though strict liability is not based
on fault. 
476
The court affirmed a judgment in favor of a physician in
Wasem v. Laskowski, 477 a malpractice case. The court held that
refusing to give an intruction on res ipsa loquitur was not error,
because the evidence presented a complex medical question that
was not within the common knowledge of laymen. 478 A concurring
opinion suggests that res ipsa instructions should seldom be given,
and an adequate instruction on circumstantial evidence is all that is
needed. 47
9
In Gegelman v. Reirsgaard,480 the court affirmed a trial court
ruling that a demand for change of venue was untimely. 481 An
extension of time to answer had been granted, but not an extension
of time to demand the change of venue, which came too late when
made with the answer. 482
471. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-07 (Stipp. 1979).
472. 274 N.W.2d at 572.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1975).
476. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Powers v. Hunt-Wesson
Foods, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974).
477. 274 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1979).
478. Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219, 225 (N.D. 1979). The evidence concerned
whether the plaintiff's paralysis was the result of the failure to remove Pantopaque dye from his
spinal cord. Id.
479. Id. at 227.
480. 273 N.W.2d 703 (N.D. 1979).
481. Cegelman v. Reirsgaard, 273 N.W.2d 703, 705 (N.D. 1979).
482. Id. at 706.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The saga of those who file income tax forms without figures,
but replete with assertions of the right not to incriminate
themselves continued, or perhaps ended, with Dorgan v. Kouba
483
and Dorgan v. Gasser.414 In these cases the court followed the
overwhelming weight of authority and held that the state income
tax laws are constitutional, that there is no right to a jury trial in a
mandamus action to compel filing, that filing a tax form is not the
same as filing a tax return, that whether or not an answer would
incriminate is for the court to decide, that taxpayers who
disapprove of certain government expenditures do not have the
option of refusing to pay taxes, and that requiring information as to
income and deductions is not a search or seizure.
48 5
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
The trend toward a higher percentage of criminal appeals
seems to be continuing. During the period under examination
about twenty-five percent of the cases involved criminal law or
procedure. A few years ago the percentage was about half that
high.
It must be said that much of the time the court is applying an
incorrect standard of review to claims of violation of constitutional
and statutory rights of the accused. An example of this error is State
v. Entze, 486 where the majority states that the trial court's error was
without prejudice and "[i]ndependent of the [b]reathalyzer test,
the record discloses sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict." ' 487
The federal courts, from the United States Supreme Court down,
have held repeatedly that the fact that there was sufficient
competent evidence from which the jury could have found guilt is
not decisive. 48 8 The test is not whether one or more judges think it
is likely or unlikely that a retrial, from which the error is
eliminated, will lead to a different result. The test is whether a
483. 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1979).
484. 274 N.W.2d 173 (N.D. 1979).
485. Dorgan v. Kotiba, 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1979), Dorgan v. Gasser, 274 N.W.2d 173
(N.D. 1979).
486. 272 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1978). For a more detailed discossion of this case see infra note 520
and text.
487. State v. Entze, 272 N.W.2d 292, 293 (N.D. 1978).
488. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United Sates v. Straoghan, 453 F.2d
422 (8th Cir. 1972); Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d312 (9th Cir. 1957).
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retrial from which the error is eliminated might lead to a different
result, or, as some courts have put it, whether any single juror might
have a reasonable doubt of guilt if the evidence had not been
heard.489
Furthermore, this state has often held that it is committed to
fair trials even when the evidence is ample for conviction. 490 The
supreme court should return to this rule, and to the rule that the
test of error in criminal cases is whether any one juror might have
voted for acquittal if the erroneous evidence or constitutional or
statutory error had been eliminated from the trial.
In State v. Schneider,491 an arresting officer testified that he ad-
vised the defendant of his Miranda492  rights, and that the
defendant responded by saying, " 'I will remain silent' as to all
questions, Sir." ' 493  No objection was made. On appeal the
defendant's attorney, new for the appeal, contended that the
response'was an impermissible comment on Schneider's right to
remain silent, and was obvious error, citing State v. Bragg. 
494
The supreme court held that the admission of the accused's
response was error of constitutional dimensions, but was "harmless
error," beyond a reasonable doubt. 495 It would seem that the
supreme court's conclusion that the error was harmless was based
solely on the idea that the silence related only to the question of
whether the defendant was driving. But the transcript shows he was
refusing to answer all questions. 496 The subsequent testimony as to
489. See Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Matos, 444 F.2d 1071 (7th
Cir. 1971).
490. SeeState v. Bragg, 221 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1974); State v. Schlittenhardt, 147 N.W.2d 118
(N.D. 1966).
491. 270 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978).
492. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
493. Record, vol. 3 at 291, State v. Schneider, 270 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978). The transcript
states: " 'I will remain silent' as to all questions, sir." Id. It seems obvious that the court reporter
misplaced the second quotation mark. It makes no sense for the testifying officer to ise the words "as
to all questions, Sir" umless they are part of the response of the accuised.
494. 221 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1974).
495. 270 N.W.2d at 793. The pertinent parts of the opinion follow:
Schneider next raises for our review the issue as to whether or not it was error for the
trial judge to admit Patrolman Ruther's testimony that he had twice advised
Schneider of his Miranda rights, that he had asked Schneider if he had been operating a
motor vehicle and that Schneider had responded "I will remain silent."
Id. at 791.
In the instant case, we hold that even if the inadmissible testimony of Patrolman
Rither created an inference of Schneider's guilt, the inference was inconsequential
and harmless in light of the fact that Schneider answered the question at trial and
admitted the element of the crime that he had been operating a motor vehicle prior to
his arrest.
Id. at 793.
496. See supra note 493.
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one matter surely does not waive his right to remain silent, and the
Miranda right to remain silent was violated.
When Schneider is read together with State v. Carmody,4 97 holding
that it is harmless error for a prosecutor to bring out that the
defendant has not testified at a preliminary hearing. 498 and State v.
Johnson,499 holding that it is harmless error to bring out that a
defendant has been accused of, or arrested for, crimes of which he
has not been convicted,500 it can only be concluded that prosecutors
can do almost anything so long as a majority of the supreme court
conclude that there is enough evidence to convict without the error.
State v. Fischer50 1 included a situation where a jailer, in the
process of enforcing a jail rule against telephone conversations of
inmates exceeding ten minutes, picked up an extension telephone
and heard a discussion of an impending sale of drugs. 50 2 The trial
court suppressed the evidence. The supreme court reversed,
holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
jail.
50 3
The court did not discuss whether the officer's actions
involved a violation of federal statutes prohibiting wiretaps without
court orders or the consent of one of the parties to the
conversation, 50 4 even though it was briefed by both parties. 50 5 If the
court had considered this question, relevant case law would have
required it to affirm the district court.
50 6
In holding that a criminal defendant has no expectation of
privacy in a jail, the court relied upon cases which did not discuss
the wiretap statute. 50 7 The court did not discuss the trend,
recognized in State ex. rel Olson v. Maxwell, 50 8 toward recognizing
that prisoners have some civil rights, even though more limited
than those of the general population.50 9
The defendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor in State v. Entze. 5 1°At the
497. 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977).
498. State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415, 418-9 (N.D. 1977).
499. 231 N.W.2d 180 (N.D. 1975).
500. State v Johnson, 231 N.W.2d 180, 185 (N.D. 1975).
501. 270 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1978).
502. State v. Fischer, 270 N.W.2d 345, 347-8 (N.D. 1978).
503. Id. at 354.
504. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-15 (1970 & Stipp. 1979).
505. Brief for Appellant-Cross-Appellee at 13-16, Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appelant at 34-36,
State v. Fischer, 270 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1978).
506. See Gerrad v. Blackman, 401 F. Stipp. 1189 (D.C. Ill. 1975); Halpin v. Suiperior Court, 6
Cal. 3d 885, 495 P.2d 1295, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1972); People v. Tebo, 194 N.W.2d 571 (Mich.
1971).
507. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
508. 259 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1977).
509. State ex rel Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 628 (N.D. 1977).
510. 272 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1978).
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trial an officer testified that he was a trained breathalyzer operator,
and his certificate to that effect was offered into evidence.5 1' When
defense counsel sought to cross-examine the officer about his
qualifications, the trial court ruled that the certificate was
conclusive as to. his training and qualifications.512 The supreme
court found that the trial court's ruling was error, but error without
.prejudice because defense counsel "was able, through subsequent
cross-examination, to gain a concession from the operator that he
did not know much about the machine, but that he knew how to
operate it. 11113
With respect, it is suggested that the supreme court was in
error. The right of cross-examination, while not without its limits,
is a fundamental right of a defendant. Here the court speculated
that the purpose of the cross-examiner was to obtain an admission
that the operator was not familiar with the operation of the
machine. This is mere speculation, and may be entirely wrong.
The purpose may have been to show that the training he received
was superficial, or that his experience with the machine was
exaggerated, or that he was otherwise unqualified. The court
should not, by guessing at the purposes of a cross-examiner and
then concluding that his purpose was accomplished, limit or
destroy the fundamental right of cross-examination.
The court properly found that no offer of proof is necessary
when relevant cross-examination is involved,5 1 4 but went on to hold
that the trial court's error was harmless because it did not affect
substantial rights. 515 It is respectfully suggested that an absolute
prohibition of cross-examination on a pertinent matter not only
affects, but destroys, a fundamental right and cannot be harmless.
Justice Vandewalle dissented on essentially the grounds
stated, pointing out that the trial court's statement that the
operator was qualified, and its ruling that the question was
irrelevant may have discounted in the juror's mind the effect of the
admission secured by defense counsel and upon which the majority
decision relied.
5 16
In State v. Larson,5 17 the court reiterated the grounds for
511. State v. Entze, 272 N.W.2d 292, 293 (N.D. 1978).
512. Id. at 294.
513. Id. at 295.
514. Id. In State v. Hager, 271 N.W.2d 476 (N.D. 1978), decided only a short time before Entze,
the court found that a trial court under N.D.R. CRIM. P. 16(h) is limited to consideration of
producibility of a statement, and "it is not to speculate if the defense counsel can effectively utilize
the statement for impeachment purposes," citing Lewis v. U.S., 340 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1965). It is
suggested that this is the rule the court should have applied to Entze, rather than speculating on the
purpose of the cross-examiner and holding the error to be "harmless."
515. 272 N.W.2d at 297. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
516. Id. at 298. (VandeWalle,J., dissenting).
517. 271 N,W.2d 1 (N.D. 1978).
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releasing a convicted defendant pending appeal, and added that if
the trial court denies release pending appeal, or imposes conditions
of release, it must state the reasons in writing for such action.
518
Two appeals involved the circumstances surrounding the
murder trial of Gary Dean Olson. In the first, Olson v. North Dakota
District Court, 519 the supreme court exercised its supervisory power
to modify a non-appealable order and granted a change of venue in
a criminal case. 520 In so doing, the court established criteria to be
used in seeking a change of venue in the future.5 21 Application of
the criteria will probably result in more changes of venue, but they
will also provide guidelines for the practitioner in a field where
there were few guidelines heretofore.
In the later appeal, State v. Olson, 522 the substantive issues were
decided. The court found no error in the trial court's retention of
jurors who had read false news stories about the trial.
5 23
Additionally, it was held that there was no error in the admission of
testimony by a cellmate of the defendant, regarding admissions
made by the defendant without a Miranda warning, when the
cellmate testified that he had not been induced by the authorities to
obtain the incriminating admissions.
524
In State v. Mees, 525 the court adhered to the objective test of
entrapment and remanded the case for a new trial. 52 6 The court
also found that, since the trial court did not impose a sentence of
confinement, the defendant, although indigent, was not entitled to
court appointed counsel on appeal. 527 In so finding, the court relied
upon rule 44 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure,
relating to trial courts and applied the rule by analogy to appeals.
The court did not discuss such cases as Douglas v. California, 5 28 and
later cases which hold that if a rich litigant has an appeal as a matter
of ri"rht and can employ an attorney, an indigent litigant must be
provided with an attorney on appeal as of right.
518. State v. Larson, 271 N.W.2d 1,3 (N.D. 1978).
519. 271 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1978).
520. Olson v. N.D. Dist. Ct., 271 N.W.2d 574, 583 (N.D. 1978).
521. Id. at 580. The court noted the four factors to be considered, contained in the explanatory
notes of N.D.R. CRI1s. P. 21 and added four additional factors from California courts in determining
whether pretrial publicity is prejudicial. These are as follows: "(1) the nature and gravity of the
offense: (2) the size of the community: (3) the status of the defendant in the community; and (4) the
popularity and prominence of the victim." Id. See People v. Witt, 53 Cal. App. 3d 154, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 653 (1976). cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916.
522. 274 N.W.2d 190 (N.D. 1979).
523. State v. Olson, 274 N.W.2d 190, 194 (N.D. 1979).
524. Id. at 195.
525. 272 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1978).
526. State v. Mees, 272 N.W.2d 284. 291 (N.D. 1978).
527. Id. at 290.




Porter v. Porter52 9 raises a number of questions in the mind of a
reader. While divorce proceedings were pending, the wife, who had
custody of the three children and possession of the home went to
work as a waitress-hostess at the Ramada Inn, presumably to
obtain necessary funds for support.5 30 At the close of the trial the
husband, a captain in the Air Force, was given custody of the
children for the reasons that "because of the employment situation
of the two parties,.... [he] was in a better position to provide for
the support and maintenance of the children and would also be able
to spend evenings with them, while. . . . [she] would be unable to
do either. "3 The possibility of payment of temporary alimony and
support so that the mother could quit her job and spend more time
with the children was not mentioned, nor was the salary of the Air
Force captain, which presumably would ha ,e been adequate to pay
child support and alimony. The court gave the wife $2,700 alimony
with the suggestion that she use it to complete her education. 532 She
also apparently received some $3,000 as a property settlement, but
when she asked for attorney's fees on appeal, she was met by the
motion of her husband that she pay his fees, and a response by the
court that she could have reserved part of her $3,000 for costs and
attorney's fees on appeal. 533 The motions of both parties were
denied .
3 4
Perhaps the statement of facts of the case is incomplete. Based
on the facts stated, one wonders whether the wife was compelled to
go to work and then penalized by having the children taken away
from her because she was working.
A rare and interesting situation developed in Geiger v. Estate of
Connelly,131 where an indenture between a foundling home and a
couple accepting placement of a child required the couple to treat
the child as an heir for inheritance purposes, even though there was
no adoption.5 36 The question before the court was whether the
couple and their natural children were thereby made heirs of the
child placed in their home.5 37 The court held that the indenture did
529. 274 N.W.2d 235 (N. D. 1979).
530. Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235, 237 (N.D. 1979). Althogh there is mention of an
interim order, there is no mention of temporary sopport being part of the order. Id. at 237-8.
531. Id. at 238. Additionally, the coort fiind that "either party woold be a 'fit and proper
person to have custody.' " Id.
532. Id. at 240.
533. Id. at 244.
534. Id.
535. 271 N.W.2d 570 (N.D. 1978).
536. Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570, 571 (N.D. 1978).
537. Id.
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not create a relationship equivalent to statutory adoption. 53
Therefore, the couple and their natural children could not take by
intestate succession from the placed child's estate.
GOVERNMENT
A forcible detainer action was brought against the defendant
in Kolling v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. 5 39 Kolling, the lessor,
brought the action alleging that zoning infractions violated the
lease. 540 There is little doubt that the violation occurred, but the
evidence showed that the city building inspector permitted the
violation to continue. 54 1 The supreme court assumed the inspector
acted on behalf of the governing body and stated that "[b]y
deciding this case in Goodyear's favor we do not sanction its
violation of any Dickinson zoning ordinances. "542 The effect of the
opinion is to sanction the violation, which the dissent points out.
543
The majority, however, sustained the judgment, which was based




North Dakota's statutory "no fault" insurance scheme 545 was
the subject of<McGarry v. Skogley. 546 It is regrettable for two reasons:
(1) the parties did not raise any of the real questions (including
constitutionality) inherent in the statute, and (2) the court used
language which can only cause difficulty in the future.
Apparently the court misunderstands the nature of an auto-
mobile accident case. The court states that certain requested
instructions "appear to define terms in the language of the no-fault
statute. . . using terminology applicable to fault-finding ac-
538. Id. at 573.
539. 272 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1978).
540. Kolling v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 272 N.W.2d 54, 55 (N.D. 1978). The lease
reqtired that the land could be used "for any other lawful purpose." Id. Dickinson zoning
regulations required a minimum of thirty off-street parking spaces, but the building permit required
only eleven spaces. Additionally, Kolling alleged that the storage of used tire carcasses not meant for
resale on the parking lot violated the Dickinson City Code. Id. at 56.
541. Id. at 56-7.
542. Id. at 60.
543. Id. (Pederson,J., dissenting).
544. Id. at 60.
545. N.D. CENT. CoDE ch. 26-41 (1978).
546. 275 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1979).
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tions.'5 47 Certainly there should be no doubt whatever that
actions permitted under the no-fault statutes are still "fault
finding" actions. Plaintiffs still sue defendants for their negligence
or fault. The misnamed "no fault" statutes only deprive injured
persons with small claims or temporary injuries of the right to sue
their tortfeasors and relegates them, as to those claims only, to the
mercies of their own insurance companies. Anyone who retains the
right to sue can, and does, sue for fault, and language indicating
that there are two kinds of instructions, fault finding and no fault,
can only confuse. The only no-fault suits under the misnamed no-
fault act are suits against one's own insurance company which has
refused to fulfill its contract to pay sums due its policy holder under
the contract.
In a well-written opinion, Wall v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance
Co.,5 48 the court resolved several questions important in health and
accident cases. Among other things, the court held that an
insurance policy will be held to mean what a reasonable person in
the position of the insured would think it meant, 549 adopted a
liberal definition of the word "accident,' 550 and held that failure to
pay premiums does not terminate the liability of the insurance
company to make installment payments of sums due because of an
accidental injury to the insured which occurred while the policy was
in effect. 5 1'
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Matter of Cieminski 52 was the first case to construe the North
Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct. The court found that
proceedings under the Code are neither civil nor criminal, but are
of a quasi administrative-judicial nature. 55  The court followed
authority from other jurisdictions 554 and determined that the
proper standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is "clear and
convincing evidence. "555
547. McGarry v. Skogley, 275 N.W.2d 321, 326 (N.D. 1979).
548. 274 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1979).
549. Wall v. Penn. Life Ins. Co., 274 N.W.2d 208, 216 (N.D. 1979).
550. Id. The court defined accident to mean a "happening by chance, unexpectedly taking
place, not according to the usual course of things." Id. (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Jackson,
400 F.2d 285, 288 (8th Cir. 1968)).
551. Id. at 218.
552. 270 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1978).
553. Matter ofCieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321, 326 (N.D. 1978).
554. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975); Geiler v. Comm'n. onJ ud. Qualifications,
10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973); In re Inquiry Relating to Rome, 218 Kan.
198, 542 P.2d 676 (1975); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re Diener, 268 Md.
659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973); In the Matter of Heuermann, 240 N.W.2d 603 (S.D. 1976).
555. 270 N.W.2d at 326.
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North Dakota Real Estate Commission v. Allen556 provided the
court with an opportunity to construe the statute relating to the
licensing of real estate brokers. 557 The court found that, due to the
wording of the statute, the requirement of a good reputation for
honesty, truthfulness, and fair dealing applied only to original
applications and not to license renewals. Therefore, a license
suspension because of a conviction for filing false tax returns was
improper.558
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
Of course, no statement of the law can be so complete as to
cover all possible contingencies. The mere statement of a rule from
one case may imply a great deal more completeness than is
intended. During the period examined in this article there are at
least two examples of how a rule broadly stated in general terms
may be picked up in an annotation and appear to say more than is
intended or appropriate.
In Wasem v. Laskowski, 559 the court's opinion states "it is nec-
essary to instruct the jury as to distinctions between direct and
circumstantial evidence." 560 This is picked up by West Publishing
Company and annotated under Trial, key numbers 204 and 209. It
should be made clear that it not always necessary to instruct the
jury on direct and circumstantial evidence. Such instructions
should not be given in cases where there is substantial direct
evidence.561
In State v. Schneider,562 the court said that the harmless and
obvious error rules of rule 52 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure "appl[y] only when an error has been made in the trial
court." 5 63 No authority is cited. If this statement means that error
by the prosecuting attorney or court personnel cannot be obvious
error, it seems to be wrong. 564 But the statement was picked up by
the annotators and will now appear under Criminal Law key
number 1162.
556. 271 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 1978).
557. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23-08(1978).
558. N.D. Real Estate Comm'n. v. Allen, 271 N.W.2d 593,596 (N.D. 1978).
559. 274 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1978).
560. Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219, 225 (N.D. 1978).
561. See United States v. Fleischman, 412 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1969).
562. 270 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978).
563. State v. Schneider, 270 N.W.2d 787, 792 (N.D. 1978).
564. See United States v. Fearns, 501 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 508 F.
2d 427 (8th Cir. 1974).
